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ABSTRACT
Essays in International Macroeconomics and Forecasting. (August 2011)
Jesus Antonio Bejarano Rojas, B.A., Universidad del Rosario;
M.S.,Universidad del Rosario
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis W. Jansen
This dissertation contains three essays in international macroeconomics and
financial time series forecasting. In the first essay, I show, numerically, that a two-
country New-Keynesian Sticky Prices model, driven by monetary and productivity
shocks, is capable of explaining the highly positive correlation across the industrialized
countries’ inflation even though their cross-country correlation in money growth rate
is negligible. The structure of this model generates cross-country correlations of
inflation, output and consumption that appear to closely correspond to the data.
Additionally, this model can explain the internal correlation between inflation and
output observed in the data.
The second essay presents two important results. First, gains from monetary
policy cooperation are different from zero when the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported goods consumption is different from one. Second, when mone-
tary policy is endogenous in a two-country model, the only Nash equilibria supported
by this model are those that are symmetrical. That is, all exporting firms in both
countries choose to price in their own currency, or all exporting firms in both countries
choose to price in the importer’s currency.
The last essay provides both conditional and unconditional predictive ability
evaluations of the aluminum futures contracts prices, by using five different econo-
metric models, in forecasting the aluminum spot price monthly return 3, 15, and
27-months ahead for the sample period 1989.01-2010.10. From these evaluations, the
iv
best model in forecasting the aluminum spot price monthly return 3 and 15 months
ahead is followed by a (VAR) model whose variables are aluminum futures contracts
price, aluminum spot price and risk free interest rate, whereas for the aluminum
spot price monthly return 27 months ahead is a single equation model in which the
aluminum spot price today is explained by the aluminum futures price 27 months
earlier. Finally, it shows that iterated multiperiod-ahead time series forecasts have a
better conditional out-of-sample forecasting performance of the aluminum spot price
monthly return when an estimated (VAR) model is used as a forecasting tool.
vTo God and my family
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation contains three essays in international macroeconomics and forecast-
ing. In the next chapter, I update the cross-country correlations in inflation, output
and money growth rate calculated by Wang and Wen (2007) until 2008 Q1. As we
will see these updated empirical findings do not differ substantially from the calcu-
lated by Wang and Wen (2007). Afterwards, I set up a two-country new Keynesian
sticky price model, which has the same modeling framework presented by Wang and
Wen (2007), but with four different features which are imperfect substitution between
home and foreign goods, home bias consumption, inflation’s inertia and both mon-
etary and productivity shocks as an uncertainty sources. With the solution of this
model, I can generate, first, a highly positive cross-country correlation in inflation
across developed countries, even though when zero cross-country correlation in the
money growth rate process across these countries is assumed 1, second a positive
cross-country correlation in output with values that do not differ substantially from
those observed in the data from the industrialized countries, and third a positive
inner-correlation between output and inflation. All these three results agree with the
observed data between 1977Q1 and 2008Q1.
In Chapter III, I propose a SDGE model which has endogenous price-setting
decision rule for exporting firms similar to that proposed by Devereux et al. (2004),
the same preferences and consumption CES aggregator as Bhattarai (2009), and a
 This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Monetary Economics.
1These countries are Australia, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom and United
States. However, the results obtained in this paper do not differ so much from shorter
data samples, which include more countries
2central bank which precommits to a monetary policy rule and which may respond to
domestic and foreign productivity shocks. The parameters of this policy rule, which
determine the degree of response to each of these shocks, are derived optimally as the
solution of an intertemporal maximization problem.2
This model has a microfounded invoicing decision rule to determine whether
exported goods should be invoiced in domestic or foreign currency, the same as pro-
posed by Devereux et al. (2004). As such, this model is comparable only with the
perfect pass-through and zero pass-though versions of Corsetti and Pesenti (2004)’s
and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
Unlike Bhattarai (2009) this model has a monetary policy rule which is endoge-
nous to the aggregated exporting firms’ invoicing currency. This feature allows a
strategic interaction between the expectations of the firms and the monetary author-
ity.
By solving this model through the second-order approximation method to the
policy function, which was developed by Collard and Juillard (2001), I show two new
important results in the international macroeconomics literature.
First, the theoretical result, obtained by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) for a two
country model with identical countries, of non-positive gains from international mon-
etary cooperation is sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between consumption of
domestic and foreign goods. Particularly, I show for different elasticity of substitution
values, calibrated in international economics literature, that gains from international
monetary cooperation are positive when two countries are identical and the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods consumption is different from
one. In addition, I show for a different country size model that gains from interna-
2The welfare function is defined as the expected discounted sum of the stream of
future households’ utility function.
3tional monetary cooperation can be positive, negative or zero when the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign goods consumption is different from one.
Second, the theoretical result obtained by Bhattarai (2009) of strategic comple-
mentarities as a sufficient condition to support the existence of the asymmetric Nash
Equilibrium (LCP,PCP) is not valid when monetary policy is determined optimally
by the central bank. For different families of preferences and elasticity of substitu-
tion values, I show that the only Nash equilibria supported by a two-country New
Keynesian SDGE model with optimal monetary policy are those which are symmet-
ric. However, this model only supports the asymmetric Cooperative equilibria under
certain preferences and elasticity of substitution values.3
Additionally, I can replicate and extend theoretical results derived in interna-
tional macroeconomics literature by Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) and Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005).
First, I extend for different families of preferences and elasticity of substitution
values one of the theoretical results found by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005). That
is, I show that (PCP,PCP) Nash Equilibrium always Pareto dominates (LCP,LCP)
equilibrium.
Second, when the preferences are logarithmic in consumption, linear in labor, and
there is unitary elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign consumption,
there exist two Nash Equilibria. In the first equilibrium (PCP,PCP), all the exporting
firms, in both countries, choose to price in their own currency (PCP) and the optimal
monetary policy is characterized by a model-derived reaction function which responds
only to domestic productivity shocks. This monetary policy rule implies a flexible
3Since Bhattarai (2009) assumes exogenous processes for monetary policy in both
countries, it is difficult to categorize if the asymmetric equilibria that they obtained
are Nash or Cooperative equilibria.
4exchange rate. In the second equilibrium (LCP,LCP), all the exporting firms, in
both countries, choose to price in the importer’s currency (LCP) and the optimal
monetary policy is characterized by a model-derived reaction function, which responds
symmetrically to both domestic and foreign productivity shocks. This monetary
policy rule implies a pegged exchange rate.4
In Chapter IV, I propose six econometric models to predict the aluminum spot
price monthly return and test statistically their prediction performance at 3, 15 and
27 steps-ahead-forecasts. The first model is a No-drift Random Walk, which has been
broadly used in the forecasting evaluation literature, see Alquist and Kilian (2010),
Swanson and Zeng (1998), Fama and French (1987) and so on. The second model is
based on the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis of futures contracts’ prices to predict
spot prices, provided by Bilson (1981). This model implies a single equation that
relates the spot price at period t+h with the futures contract price at period t, which
matures at period t+h. That is, if we have a 3-months future contract, the Speculative
Efficiency Hypothesis model is represented by the spot price as a function of the 3
month futures price three months ago as long as I am using monthly data. The third
model, based on the Financial Cost of Carry Theory, is a VAR in differences which
has three endogenous variables: spot price, futures price and risk free rate. Since I
found that aluminum futures prices, spot prices and treasury bills interest rates are
cointegrated (see this paper appendix for more details), the fourth model is a VECM,
which has these three latest variables.
The fifth model, based on the Storage Cost of Carry Theory, assumes that rather
than having a commodity for hedging risk or speculation, there is an unobservable
4This result is robust to country size. Also, we can see that when the two countries
have the same size, optimal monetary policy are identical to those derived by Corsetti
and Pesenti (2004).
5benefit of having the commodity, which can be represented as a function of the in-
ventories and the spot price volatility. For more details see Pindyck (2001).5 Here,
I represent this storage cost model through a VAR in differences, which has five en-
dogenous variables: spot price, futures price, risk-free asset interest rate, inventories
and spot price volatility. Since I found that aluminum futures prices, spot prices,
inventories, spot price volatility and treasury bills interest rates are cointegrated (see
this paper appendix for more details), the sixth model is a VECM, which has these
five latest variables.
In contrast to most of the commodity forecasting evaluation literature, the pre-
dictive ability (or forecasting performance) evaluations, here, are not mainly based
on ordinal comparisons between two models’ expected loss functions. Instead, our
forecasting performance evaluations are based on both unconditional and conditional
prediction ability tests proposed by Giacomini and White (2006). The use of these
tests have a great advantage over traditional ability prediction tests such as Diebold
and Mariano (1995) tests because they allow to test predictive ability not only for
non-nested models but also for nested models. As an example of nested models’ fore-
casting performance evaluation, in this paper, is the comparison in conditional and
unconditional forecasting performance between the Financial Cost of Carry vs. the
Storage Cost models.
By using Giacomini and White (2006) predictive ability tests, I find that, for
both 3 and 15 months ahead forecast, Storage Cost models does not improve the
5This theory assumes that there is a benefit of having physical ownership of the
commodity [see Brennan (1958) and Working (1949) for more details]. This benefit
is called the convenience yield. Also, this theory assumes that there is a variable
storage cost associated with storing the commodity until the expiration of the futures
contract. As a result, the net storage cost is, defined as the difference between the
total storage cost and the convenience yield, is a function of inventories and spot price
volatility.
6aluminum spot price monthly return’s forecast with respect to the Financial Cost of
Carry Models. However, these two models have a better spot price monthly return
forecast performance than the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis Model, which in turn
has better conditional and unconditional forecast performance than the Random Walk
model. Unlike the predictive ability test for 3 and 15 months ahead forecasts, I find
that, for 27 months ahead forecasts, neither the Financial Cost of Carry nor Storage
Cost models outperform the Speculative Efficiency model, however the Speculative
Efficiency model has better conditional and unconditional forecasting performance
than the Random Walk model.
Given the versatility of Giacomini and White (2006) conditional and uncondi-
tional tests to compare not only predictive ability between models but also forecasting
methodologies, as an additional contribution to the forecasting evaluation literature, I
find that both conditional and unconditional forecasting performance by iterating au-
toregressive models (this forecasting methodology is called iterated multistep forecast)
is better than using horizon-specific estimated models (this forecasting methodology
is called direct multistep forecast). Unlike Stock et al. (2006), I make a univariate
forecast evaluation for the aluminum spot price and I use the asymptotic predictive
ability tests provided by Giacomini and White (2006) that converge in distribution
to conventional probability functions rather than using complicated bootstraps pro-
cedures as those provided by Stock et al. (2006).
Finally, I present a summary of this dissertation in Chapter V.
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A STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION OF COMOVEMENTS IN INFLATION
ACROSS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
A. Introduction
During the last years, economists have expressed a deep interest in studying the
international comovements in inflation across countries, particularly industrialized
countries. In particular, Ciccarelli and Mojon (2008) and Neely and Rapach (2008)
are interested in the role that global inflation movements play as an attractor of do-
mestic inflation. Furthermore, Wang and Wen (2007) are interested in finding the
sources and mechanisms explaining the observed international comovements in infla-
tion. In the cross-country investigation of inflation dynamics prepared by Wang and
Wen (2007), they find for the period covered between 1977 Q1 and 1998 Q4 that
the average cross-country correlation in inflation for developed countries is high and
positive, although the cross-country correlation in money growth rate is near zero.
This finding is a puzzle, at least for people who believe in the quantity theory of
money. In addition, they conclude that standard new Keynesian sticky-information
and sticky-price models driven only by monetary shocks are not able to explain the
highly positive cross-country correlation in inflation when the monetary shocks are
uncorrelated across developed countries. In this paper, I update the cross-country
correlations in inflation, output and money growth rate calculated by Wang and Wen
(2007) until 2008 Q1. As we will see these updated empirical findings do not differ
substantially from the calculated by Wang and Wen (2007). Afterwards, I set up a
two-country new Keynesian sticky price model, which has the same modeling frame-
work presented by Wang and Wen (2007), but with four different features which
8are imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods, home bias consump-
tion, inflation’s inertia and both monetary and productivity shocks as an uncertainty
sources. With the solution of this model, I can generate, first, a highly positive cross-
country correlation in inflation across developed countries, even though when zero
cross-country correlation in the money growth rate process across these countries is
assumed 6, second a positive cross-country correlation in output with values that do
not differ substantially from those observed in the data from the industrialized coun-
tries, and third a positive inner-correlation between output and inflation. All these
three results agree with the observed data between 1977Q1 and 2008Q1.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I present the stylized facts
that describe the puzzle found by Wang and Wen (2007). Then, I set up and cal-
ibrate the model with the four features mentioned above. Next, I explain how the
assumptions of imperfect substitution and home bias consumption can generate a
positive cross-country correlation in inflation between two symmetric countries when
productivity shocks are assumed as a sole uncertainty’s source in this model. Since
productivity shocks, as a unique uncertainty’s source, cannot generate a positive
inner-correlation between output and inflation, I describe the mechanism of how this
model can generate this inner-correlation by assuming monetary shocks as a unique
uncertainty’s source. As I mentioned above, having monetary shocks as unique uncer-
tainty’s source cannot generate a highly positive cross-country correlation in inflation,
I explain how the assumption of inflation’s inertia and both productivity and mon-
etary shocks can generate jointly a positive cross-country correlation in inflation, con-
6These countries are Australia, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom and United
States. However, the results obtained in this paper do not differ so much from shorter
data samples, which include more countries.
9sumption and output, and a positive inner-correlation in inflation and output. Fi-
nally, I present the unconditional cross-country correlations in inflation, output, and
consumption generated by this model’s solution under the following three different
scenarios. When productivity is the sole uncertainty’s source, when money growth
rate is the only uncertainty’s source and when both productivity and money growth
rate are the uncertainty’s sources in this model.
B. Stylized Facts
Wang and Wen (2007) calculated the cross-country correlation in inflation from 1977
Q1 until 1998 Q1. I updated this through 2008 Q1. As we can see, Table I, which
displays data from 1977Q1 until 2008Q1, shows that the cross-country correlation in
inflation between the industrialized countries is still very high and positive. In the
same way, Table II shows that some cross-country correlations in M1 growth rate are
near zero and some of them are negative.7
7I do not include the European Union Countries, since many of them adopted the
Euro from 1999.
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Table I.
Cross-country Correlation in Inflation (mean = 0.6084)
Sample: 1977 Q1 - 2008 Q1
Australia Canada Japan UK USA
Australia 1.0000 0.6320 0.4500 0.4576 0.5248
Canada 0.6320 1.0000 0.6020 0.6024 0.7756
Japan 0.4500 0.6020 1.0000 0.6543 0.6705
UK 0.4576 0.6024 0.6543 1.0000 0.7150
USA 0.5248 0.7756 0.6705 0.7150 1.0000
Table II.
Cross-country Correlation in Money Growth Rate (mean = 0.015)
Sample: 1977 Q1 - 2008 Q1
Australia Canada Japan UK USA
Australia 1.0000 -0.0860 -0.1593 0.1019 0.0845
Canada -0.0860 1.0000 0.0281 0.0399 0.0387
Japan -0.1593 0.0281 1.0000 0.1380 0.0966
UK 0.1019 0.0399 0.1380 1.0000 -0.1289
USA 0.0845 0.0387 0.0966 -0.1289 1.0000
11
Table III shows that the cross-country correlation in output is positive but not
as high as the cross-country correlation in inflation across these countries. Moreover,
Table IV shows a very low domestic correlation between inflation and output.
Table III.
Cross-country Correlation in Output (mean = 0.3472)
Sample: 1977 Q1 - 2008 Q1
Australia Canada Japan UK USA
Australia 1.0000 0.0469 0.6252 0.3270 0.4914
Canada 0.0469 1.0000 0.0981 0.0791 0.1260
Japan 0.6252 0.0981 1.0000 0.5314 0.5773
UK 0.3270 0.0791 0.5314 1.0000 0.5700
USA 0.4914 0.1260 0.5773 0.5700 1.0000
Table IV.
Domestic Correlation between Output and Inflation (mean = 0.2147)
Sample: 1977 Q1 - 2008 Q1
Australia Canada Japan UK USA
Correlation 0.1961 0.1780 0.0702 0.2595 0.3698
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From Tables I and II, it can be inferred that the average cross-country correla-
tion in inflation across these countries is equal to 0.6 while the average cross-country
correlation in money growth rate is equal to 0.0154. So the puzzle of highly posi-
tive cross-country correlation in inflation accompanied with a negligible cross-country
correlation in money growth rate still holds. For the purpose of this research, this
puzzle will be called the Wang and Wen’s puzzle.
C. The Model
1. Environment
• Households live infinite number of periods; they consume a basket of final goods,
which can be domestic or imported.
• There exists imperfect substitution in the consumption of domestic and foreign
goods.
• Households are endowed with l¯ units of time, which they can spend on leisure
or labor.
• Households are the owner of all firms.
• Only final goods are tradable.
• Intermediate goods firms are producing in a monopolistically competitive mar-
ket.
• Final goods prices are sticky.
• Intermediate goods’ factors are produced in a perfectly competitive market.
• There is a regime of floating exchange rate.
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• Money supply is determined by an exogenous stochastic process for the money
growth rate.
• Total factor productivity is determined by an exogenous stochastic process.
2. Households
The representative household chooses {Ct, Nt, B(st+1),Mt+1} which maximizes its
lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt /(1− σ)− ψN1+ηt /(1 + η)
]
(2.1)
subject to:
Tt +Bt +Mt + Πt + PtWtNt ≥ PtCt +
∞∑
st+1
Q(st+1|st)B(st+1) +Mt+1 (2.2)
Mt + Tt +Bt ≥ PtCt +
∞∑
st+1
Q(st+1|st)B(st+1) (2.3)
taking: Mt, Tt, Pt,Πt,Mt,Wt, Q(s
t+1|st) as given, where Ct is the composed consump-
tion at date t, Nt represents the worked hours, Tt is a lump sum transfer of flow of
money that the representative household receives from the Government, Mt is the
representative household’s money holdings in home currency carried over from the
last period, Bt are the nominal bonds expressed in domestic currency, Pt denotes the
consumer’s price index, Wt is the real wage (deflated by using the consumer price
index) and Q(st+1|st) is the price at t of a bond that next period would yield B(st+1)
and Πt is the intermediate goods producer’s profit. The variables for the foreign
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country are denoted with star.
F.O.C
The first order conditions from the representative household’s maximization problem
are as follows:
Ct : C
−σ
t − λt − µt = 0 (2.4)
Nt : −ψNηt + λtWt = 0 (2.5)
Mt+1 : −λt/Pt + βEt
[
λt+1 + µt+1/Pt+1
]
= 0 (2.6)
B(st+1) :
[
λt + µt/Pt
]
Q(st+1|st)−
β
[
λ(st+1|st) + µ(st+1|st)/P (st+1|st)
]
= 0
(2.7)
where, at each period t, the representative household chooses CH,t and CF,t which
minimizes its total expenditure:
PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t (2.8)
given, that they have chosen {Ct}∞t=0 previously and subject to:
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Ct = C
γ
H,tC
1−γ
F,t (2.9)
where CH,t denotes the home consumption of the domestic final good, CF,t denotes the
home consumption of the foreign final good, PH,t and PF,t are their prices respectively.
As we can see (2.9) is an implication of assuming imperfect substitution in con-
sumption between domestic and foreign goods.
The main result of this intratemporal minimization problem is that the economy’s
price level can be expressed as a function of the prices of home and foreign goods.
That is,
Pt = φP
γ
H,tP
1−γ
F,t (2.10)
where φ =
[
(γ/ 1− γ)1−γ + (1− γ/ γ)γ
]
3. Firms
a. Final Good
Each country produces a single final good through the following production function:
YH,t =
(∫ 1
0
(YH,t(i))
ζ−1/ζdi
)ζ/ζ−1
(2.11)
where YH,t(i) is the intermediate i good which is non tradable and ζ measures the
elasticity of substitution among the intermediate goods, YH,t(i).
The optimization problem of the final good producer is to find the optimal set
of inputs YH,t(i) maximizing:
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PH,tYH,t −
∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)YH,t(i)di (2.12)
subject to (2.11)
F.O.C
YH,t(i) : PH,tY
1/ζ
H,t Y
−1/ζ
H,t (i)− PH,t(i) = 0 (2.13)
b. Intermediate Good Firms
Each intermediate good i is produced by a single monopolistically competitive firm
according to the following technology:
YH,t(i) = AH,tNt(i) (2.14)
AH,t = A
ρ
H,t exp
At (2.15)
where AH,t is the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) , which is the same for every i
firm and At is a stochastic process which follows a normal distribution with zero mean
and constant variance, σ2A.
c. Price Setting
Following Calvo (1983), I assume that each individual firm resets its price with prob-
ability (1 − θ) each period independently of the time elapsed since its last price
adjustment. Thus, each period a measure (1 − θ) of (randomly selected) firms reset
their prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged.
Let PH,t(i) denotes the price set by a firm i adjusting its price in period t. Let
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PH,t(i) denotes the price set by a firm i adjusting its price in period t. Under the Calvo
price setting structure, PH,t+k(i) = PH,t(i) with probability θ
k for k = 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,
... .
Then, the firm’s optimal price setting model is written as follows:
PH,t(i) = arg max
∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+kEt
[
PH,t(i)−MCh,t(i)
]
(2.16)
subject to (2.13) and taking YH,t+k as given.
d. Price Index Dynamics
Under the assumed price-setting structure, the dynamics of the domestic price index
is described by the following equation:
PH,t =
[
θP 1−ζH,t−1 + (1− θ)Pˇ 1−ζH,t
]1/1−ζ
(2.17)
In order to introduce persistence in the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve, I use the same
approach as Gali and Gertler (1999). Consider a fraction of firms, (1−χ), that follow
the optimal updating price rule, PH,t and a fraction of firms χ that follow a backward
looking adjustment process,P bh,t. That is,
PˇH,t =
[
χ(P bH,t)
1−ζ + (1− χ)(PH,t)1−ζ
]1/1−ζ
(2.18)
P bH,t = PH,t−1(1 + pit−1) (2.19)
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4. Government
The government transfers to individuals a lump sum transfer of flow of money.
Tt = MtUt+1 (2.20)
where the gross money growth rate follow the subsequent stochastic process:
Ut = (Ut)
ς(U)1−ς exp
U
t (2.21)
where U¯ is the steady state money growth rate, Ut denotes the stochastic process
which follows a normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance, σ2U .
Since both countries are identical, then the mathematical expressions and pa-
rameterization that are described above are the same for the other country.
5. Equilibrium Conditions
YH,t = CH,t + C
∗
F,t (2.22)
YH,t = C
∗
H,t + CF,t (2.23)
τt = (1 + pit+1)M˜t+1 − M˜t (2.24)
τ ∗t = (1 + pi
∗
t+1)M˜
∗
t+1 − M˜∗t (2.25)
where τt = Tt/Pt and M˜t = Mt/Pt
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D. Model Predictions and Results
1. Calibration
Table V presents the calibration of this model which largely follows Wang and Wen
(2007) with the addition of two parameters. The first one is the expenditure share on
domestic goods γ which comes from allowing imperfect substitution in consumption
between domestic and foreign goods, and assuming a Cobb-Douglas consumption
aggregator. This value is between 0.7 and 0.94, which is a range under most of the
calibrations and estimations of this parameter, in international macroeconomics, fall
within. See Chari et al. (2002), Adolfson et al. (2005) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2005) for more details about this parameter estimation. The second one is the
probability of adjusting the price based in the past period optimal reset price χ.
Also in this model, I use estimated and calibrated parameters from important papers
in monetary economics and international macroeconomics such as Gali and Gertler
(1999) and Backus et al. (1992) respectively.
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Table V.
Baseline Calibration
Parameter Source
σ = 0.05 Wang and Wen (2007)
η = 0.05 Wang and Wen (2007)
β = 0.99 Wang and Wen (2007)
ς = 0.60 Wang and Wen (2007)
γ = 0.81 Calibrated by the author
θ = 0.80 Gali and Gertler (1999)
χ = 0.85 Gali and Gertler (1999)
σA = σA∗ = 0.085 Backus et al. (1992)
σU = σU∗ = 0.85 Backus et al. (1992)
ρ(
A, A
∗
) = 0.258 Backus et al. (1992)
ρ(
U , U
∗
) = 0.00 Wang and Wen (2007)
Note: The symbol ρ(x, y) represents the unconditional correlation between two
stochastic processes.
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2. Predicted Unconditional Correlations
In this subsection, I present the results implied by this model when it is driven by
a) only productivity shocks, b) only monetary shocks and c) both monetary and
productivity shocks.
a. Productivity Shocks Only
One important result provided by this model is its capability of generating cross-
country correlation in inflation and output close to the observed data when produc-
tivity shocks in each country are the sole uncertainty’s source, see Table VI. This
interesting result is a consequence of the following three assumptions: imperfect sub-
stitution in consumption between foreign and home goods, home bias consumption
and the presence of only productivity shocks processes in this model. To clarify the
role of these assumptions behind this result, consider a world economy with only two
countries USA and UK, then suppose that there is a one-time transitory but persis-
tent shock to USA’s productivity process. In response to this shock, USA’s output
jumps up causing that USA’s final goods will be cheaper than UK’s final goods. This
change in the relative prices is reflected in a jump up of USA’s terms of trade (a
jump down in UK’s terms of trade). Since I assume home bias consumption, USA’s
total consumption basket is cheaper than UK’s total consumption basket, which is a
jump up in USA’s real exchange rate (obviously a jump down in UK’s real exchange
rate). Because of the risk sharing condition, this change in USA’s real exchange rate
implies a jump up in USA’s total consumption and a jump down in UK’s total con-
sumption. On the other hand, this fall in UK’s consumption shifts UK’s labor supply
curve to the right, which in turn generates a fall in UK’s real wage. Inasmuch as the
real marginal cost in both countries is a positive function of the domestic real wage
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and the terms of trade, and a negative function of the domestic productivity process,
UK’s real marginal cost jumps down since both UK’s terms of trade and UK’s real
wage have jumped down. This jump in UK’s real marginal cost causes a fall in UK’s
domestic goods inflation (see equation (C.19), in the context of UK).
Moreover, since the effect of USA’s terms of trade is lower than the effect of both
USA’s productivity and USA’s real wage on USA’s real marginal cost, then this latter
variable jumps down and in turn USA’s domestic goods inflation falls.
Since I have assumed imperfect substitution in consumption between home and
foreign goods, then total inflation is a function not only of domestic goods inflation
but also a function of foreign goods inflation. Therefore, it is necessary to consider
the dynamics of foreign goods inflation of each country. As long as foreign goods
inflation is a positive function of terms of trade growth rate, it is expected a fall in
UK’s foreign goods inflation and hence in the UK’s total inflation. However, in USA
the story is different because in response of this USA’s productivity shock, USA’s
terms of trade jumps up and therefore USA’s foreign goods inflation does increase.
Inasmuch as, USA’s productivity shock has a stronger impact than USA’s terms
of trade on USA’s real marginal cost, then domestic goods inflation falls. Since, I
assume home bias consumption, then USA’s total goods inflation also falls.
Therefore, we should expect a highly positive cross-country correlation in infla-
tion between these two countries.
Furthermore, to put this model in perspective with the standard international
RBC models, I assume a moderate positive cross-country correlation in productivity
shocks between the two countries, assumed in this model, to generate a positive cross-
country correlation in consumption. The cross-country correlation in consumption
generated by this model is reported in Table VI which is similar to the reported by
Backus et al. (1992).
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Table VI.
Predicted Correlations - Source of Uncertainty: Productivity Shocks
γ χ ρ(pit, pi
∗
t ) ρ(yt, y
∗
t ) ρ(ct, c
∗
t ) ρ(pit, yt)
0.66 0.00 0.7746 0.7690 0.2373 -0.0511
0.66 0.50 0.8057 0.7879 0.2820 -0.0488
0.66 0.85 0.9351 0.9262 0.6936 -0.0401
0.76 0.00 0.5356 0.5720 0.1225 -0.0510
0.76 0.50 0.5666 0.5888 0.1474 -0.0489
0.76 0.85 0.7806 0.7873 0.4906 -0.0403
0.81 0.00 0.4463 0.4826 0.1247 -0.0508
0.81 0.50 0.4707 0.4958 0.1418 -0.0487
0.81 0.85 0.6779 0.6881 0.4164 -0.0403
Data 0.6000 0.3472 0.3200c 0.2147
Note: a) The symbol ρ(x, y) represents the unconditional correlation between two
stochastic processes. b) The bold numbers are the results obtained by using the
Baseline calibration. c) This value was calculated by Kehoe and Perri (2002).
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b. Monetary Shocks Only
When I assume productivity shocks alone, the model does not capture the inner cor-
relation of inflation and output observed in the data. That is, the model does not
generate a Phillips curve. To understand how this model generates the positive rela-
tionship between inflation and output, I assume that money growth rate shocks are
the only uncertainty sources in this model. To be consistent with the observed data,
I assume that this shock is uncorrelated between the two countries, assumed in this
model. As we can see in Table VII, with this shock the model is able to generate a
positive inner-correlation between inflation and output but it is not able to generate
a positive cross-country correlation in inflation between the two countries. The mech-
anism, which explains this result, is the following. Consider a world economy with
only two countries USA and UK, then suppose that there is a one-time transitory but
persistent shock to USA’s money growth rate. This cause a jump up in USA’s total
consumption in view of the households have more money to spend in consumption
goods. Since home bias consumption is assumed in this model, the raise in USA’s
domestic consumption is higher than the raise in USA’s foreign consumption, USA’s
terms of trade jump up, this in turn causes a real depreciation of the dollar with re-
spect to the sterling pound. This real depreciation of the dollar (or real appreciation
of the sterling pound) causes a jump down in UK’s consumption since the risk sharing
condition holds.
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Inasmuch as UK’s consumption fall is larger than UK’s real wage fall, UK’s agents
need to work more hours to increase their output and therefore improve their exports
value. Since the real wages and the terms of trade in UK jumped off, UK’s real
marginal cost also jumps down and in turn UK’s inflation decreases.
In USA the story is different. The jump up in USA’s consumption shift backward
the labor supply curve, which leads a raise in the real wage. This jump in the USA’s
real wage causes a jump up in USA’s worked hours and therefore in USA’s output.
Since there is a real depreciation of the dollar with respect to the sterling pound and
a higher real wage, the USA’s real marginal cost jumps up also. This jump in USA’s
real marginal cost causes an increment in USA’s inflation.
Therefore, the model captures an inner positive correlation between USA’s infla-
tion and USA’s output.8 However, with this monetary shock alone, the model is not
able to generate the positive cross-country correlation in inflation between USA and
UK.
8Also we can see that this experiment shows a negative inner correlation between
UK’s inflation and UK’s output. However, if I generate a money supply shock in
UK , I will obtain the Phillips curve for UK. In the stochastic simulation’s outcomes
reported in Table VII, I assume uncorrelated monetary shocks for each country.
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Table VII.
Predicted Correlations - Source of Uncertainty: Money Growth Rate Shocks
γ χ ρ(pit, pi
∗
t ) ρ(yt, y
∗
t ) ρ(ct, c
∗
t ) ρ(pit, yt)
0.66 0.00 -0.4779 0.2991 -0.4361 0.8519
0.66 0.50 -0.3650 0.2341 -0.4911 0.9030
0.66 0.85 0.1530 0.4568 -0.2754 0.4086
0.76 0.00 -0.2147 0.1610 -0.3496 0.9620
0.76 0.50 -0.1348 0.1253 -0.3812 0.9673
0.76 0.85 0.2151 0.3189 -0.1944 0.3752
0.81 0.00 -0.1385 0.1116 -0.2811 0.9812
0.81 0.50 -0.0842 0.0868 -0.3041 0.9703
0.81 0.85 0.1801 0.2508 -0.1437 0.3543
Data 0.6000 0.3472 0.3200c 0.2147
Note: a) The symbol ρ(x, y) represents the unconditional correlation between two
stochastic processes. b) The bold numbers are the results obtained by using the
Baseline calibration. c) This value was calculated by Kehoe and Perri (2002).
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c. Productivity and Monetary Shocks
In order to generate a jointly high and positive cross-country correlation in inflation
across countries, and a positive inner correlation between inflation and output, I
assume the presence of both monetary and productivity shocks in this model. In
addition, I show the role playing by the assumption of inflation’s inertia in this model
to generate these two important results.
As we saw above, the productivity shocks in this model generates a highly positive
cross-country correlation in inflation but the monetary shocks in this model generates
a negative cross-country correlation in inflation and a highly positive inner-correlation
between inflation and output.
In addition to have both productivity and monetary shocks, it is important to
see how the degree of inflation’s inertia can affect the model’s results. For example,
when the degree of inflation’s inertia,χ, takes lower values, the effect of monetary
policy in inflation is very high.9 Therefore, when I include both productivity and the
monetary shocks in this model, the cross-country correlation in inflation is negative.
In addition, it is expected that the model generate a high inner correlation between
inflation and output because the effects of monetary policy on inflation outweigh that
of productivity shocks on inflation.
9Inflation’s inertia is the result of having a fraction of firms which adjust their
prices following the backward looking rule represented by equations 2.18 and 2.19.
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However, when the degree of inflation’s inertia,χ, takes high values, the effect of
monetary policy in inflation is very low. Therefore, in Table VIII, I show that if I
include both the productivity and the monetary shocks in this model, the positive
cross-country correlation in inflation is still high and positive but lower than the case
in which the model has only productivity shocks. In addition, with these two shocks
the model still presents a positive inner correlation in inflation and output but lower
than the case in which the model has only monetary shocks.
One remaining issue is the relative size of the cross-country correlation in in-
flation and the cross-country correlation in output. In the data the cross-country
correlation in inflation is higher than the cross-country correlation in output, but in
my model the opposite is true. Future work, like adding habit persistence in house-
holds consumption, sticky wages, or sticky imports prices, might usefully focus on
addressing this issue.
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Table VIII.
Predicted Correlations - Source of Uncertainty: Productivity and Money Growth
Rate Shocks
γ χ ρ(pit, pi
∗
t ) ρ(yt, y
∗
t ) ρ(ct, c
∗
t ) ρ(pit, yt)
0.66 0.00 -0.0115 0.5883 -0.1006 0.3970
0.66 0.50 0.1365 0.5949 -0.0906 0.3800
0.66 0.85 0.6513 0.8031 0.3196 0.0992
0.76 0.00 0.1681 0.4160 -0.0844 0.3928
0.76 0.50 0.2464 0.4317 -0.0653 0.3578
0.76 0.85 0.5944 0.6636 0.2653 0.0843
0.81 0.00 0.1834 0.3439 -0.0425 0.3816
0.81 0.50 0.2350 0.3605 -0.0236 0.3426
0.81 0.85 0.5184 0.5739 0.2471 0.0767
Data 0.6000 0.3472 0.3200c 0.2147
Note: a) The symbol ρ(x, y) represents the unconditional correlation between two
stochastic processes. b) The bold numbers are the results obtained by using the
Baseline calibration. c) This value was calculated by Kehoe and Perri (2002).
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E. Conclusion
One of the new challenges for the central banks is to identify what kind of domestic
shocks affect the world economy and how they are transmitted to the rest of the
world. In particular, we are interested in how the inflationary shocks are transmitted
between countries.
In this paper I have presented a very simple two-country new-Keynesian model in
which the inclusion of imperfect substitution between home and foreign consumption,
home bias consumption, inflation’s inertia and the existence of productivity shocks
as well as monetary shocks are key for solving the Wang and Wen (2007)’s puzzle of
the joint occurrence of positive cross-country correlation in inflation and a near-zero
cross-country correlation in money growth.
Although this model adequately captures the signs and magnitude of the cross
country-correlations in inflation, output, and consumption, this model tends to gen-
erate a stronger positive cross country correlation in output than inflation. Future
work is needed to investigate whether this model can generate a stronger positive
cross country correlation in inflation than in output.
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CHAPTER III
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY UNDER ENDOGENOUS CURRENCY
INVOICING
A. Introduction
Producers of export goods have to decide in which currency they set their prices, in
their own currency or that of the importer. It is well know that firms in most countries
around the world set prices of export goods in US dollars; however in developed
countries like Germany, Switzerland, Italy and the United Kingdom, a considerable
share of exports are invoiced in their own respective currencies.10
It turns out that the choice of invoicing currency is non-trivial. This decision
can affect not only exporting firms profits but also macroeconomics variables such
as nominal exchange rate, output and consumption. Devereux and Engel (2003), in
a one-period two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model
with sticky prices, found that the optimal monetary policy, particularly the degree of
exchange rate flexibility, depends on the currency invoicing choice made by exporting
firms. If all exporting firms invoice in the importer currency (Local Currency Pricing,
LCP), the optimal monetary policy is a fixed nominal exchange rate, while if all
exporting firms set their prices in their own currency (Producer Currency Pricing,
PCP), the optimal monetary policy is a flexible exchange rate.11 Note, however, that
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Devereux and Engel (2003) take as given the price-
setting decision of the exporting firm, so their model does not predict whether an
10According to Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), the fraction of exports to the USA
not priced in dollars is 40% from Germany, 38% from Switzerland, 22% from Italy,
21% from Japan, 20% from the UK.
11The last part of this result was obtained earlier by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
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economy will end up in a flexible exchange rate equilibrium with (PCP) or in a fixed
exchange rate equilibrium with (LCP).
To address this problem Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) propose a model similar
to Devereux and Engel (2003) but with an endogenous mechanism of price-setting
for exporting firms. Their model yields two Nash Equilibria. In the first equilibrium
(PCP,PCP), all exporting firms in both countries choose to price in their own currency
(PCP) and the optimal monetary policy is characterized by a model-derived reaction
function in which nominal money balances respond only to domestic productivity
shocks. This monetary policy rule implies a flexible exchange rate.
In the second equilibrium (LCP,LCP), all exporting firms in both countries
choose to price in the importer’s currency (LCP) and the optimal monetary pol-
icy is characterized by a model-derived reaction function in which nominal money
balances respond symmetrically to both domestic and foreign productivity shocks.
This monetary policy rule implies a pegged exchange rate.
One issue with Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) is that the price setting objective
function lacks of clear microfoundations, and this causes some problems in interpreting
their derived pass through parameter, especially when it takes intermediate values
between zero and one.12 Devereux et al. (2004)’s price setting rule comes with clearer
microfoundations but they assume an exogenous monetary policy.
An additional issue with Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti
(2005) is that they assume a unitary intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
12Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) define a mechanism in which firms choose an optimal
level of pass-through, which takes values between 0 and 1. When this endogenous
pass-through takes a value equal to 1, it implies that exporting firms are invoicing
in their own currency while if it takes a value equal to 0, it implies that these same
firms are invoicing in the importer currency. However, it is not clear what is the
price-setting decision made by exporting firms when the pass-through is equal to an
intermediate value, e.g. 0.5 or 0.7.
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domestic and foreign goods consumption (Armington elasticity of substitution), but
what is observed in the data is that the Armington elasticity of substitution is not
necessarily equal to one. In fact, Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) estimated for USA
significant Armington elasticities of substitution for 163 goods whose values range
between 0.14 and 3.49 and mean is around 1.5. Furthermore, many authors in inter-
national economics literature like Backus et al. (1995), Chari et al. (2002), Heathcote
and Perri (2002), and Kydland et al. (2009) assume in their models Armington elas-
ticity of substitution values different from one.
In order to carry out an empirical validation of the existing theory of currency in-
voices, Bhattarai (2009) set up a multiperiod sticky-prices two-country DSGE model
to derive the endogenous price-setting conditions that allow exporting firms to de-
termine whether to invoice their exports in PCP or LCP. By using more general
consumer preferences or round about production,13 he derived sufficient conditions
that support the existence of asymmetric Nash equilibria. These equilibria are char-
acterized by exporting firms in the Home country that invoice their exports in their
own currency (PCP) and exporting firms in the Foreign country that invoice their
exports in the importers currency (LCP). Bhattarai (2009) attributes the existence
of this asymmetric equilibrium to the presence of strategic complementarities in his
model.14
One issue with Bhattarai (2009) is that he assumes exogenous processes for mon-
etary policy, for both countries. This assumption implies that monetary authority’s
decisions cannot be affected by foreign exporting firms’ invoicing and this causes that
his model predictions will be subject to the Lucas Critique.
13This concept was originally proposed by Basu (1995).
14The concept of strategic complementarities in two-country models was defined by
Steinsson (2008).
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In this paper, I propose a two-country DSGE model which has endogenous price-
setting decision rule for exporting firms similar to that proposed by Devereux et al.
(2004), constant relative risk aversion preferences, CES consumption aggregator, and
a central bank which precommits to a monetary policy rule and which may respond
to domestic and foreign productivity shocks. The parameters of this policy rule,
which determine the degree of response to each of these shocks, are derived optimally
as the solution of the representative household’s intertemporal welfare maximization
problem.15
Since this model has the same exporting firms invoicing decision rule as the
proposed by Devereux et al. (2004), then this model is comparable only with the
perfect pass-through and zero pass-though versions of Corsetti and Pesenti (2004)’s
and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
Unlike Bhattarai (2009), this model has a monetary policy rule which is endoge-
nous to the aggregated exporting firms’ currency invoicing choice. This feature allows
a strategic interaction between the firm expectations and the monetary authority’s
reaction function.
By solving this model through the second-order approximation method to the
policy function, which was developed by Collard and Juillard (2001), I find that after
implementing the currency invoice rule developed by Devereux et al. (2004), this
model can replicate the theoretical results obtained by Corsetti and Pesenti (2004)
and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) when the Armington elasticity of substitution is equal
to one, and preferences are logarithmic in consumption and linear in labor. However,
when I assume in this model more general preferences, such as constant relative risk
aversion utility function, and Armington elasticity of substitution different from one,
15The preferences and consumption aggregator assumed in this paper encompass
those assumed by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
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I find three new important results in the international macroeconomics literature.
First, the theoretical result, obtained by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) for a two
country model with identical countries, of non-positive gains in welfare from interna-
tional monetary cooperation does not hold when the Armington elasticity of substi-
tution is different from one. In fact, I find with this model that those gains in welfare
are positive and significant under some particular Armington elasticity of substitution
values. Furthermore, even though gains from international monetary cooperation are
positive when the Armington elasticity of substitution is different from one, I show
that if this elasticity is different from one but equal to the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption and exporting firms in both countries set their prices in
their own currency, gains from international monetary cooperation are equal to zero.
Second, for different risk aversion coefficients, Frisch elasticities and Armington
elasticity of substitution values, this model predicts a unique and symmetric Nash
equilibrium (PCP,PCP) when the Armington elasticity of substitution is less than
one without matter whether there are or not strategic complementarities. In this
equilibrium, all exporting firms in both countries choose to price in their own currency
and the central bank’s optimal monetary policy implies a flexible exchange rate. In
addition, this model predicts multiple Nash equilibria when the Armington elasticity
of substitution is larger and equal than one.
In the first equilibrium (PCP,PCP), all exporting firms, in both countries, choose
to price in their own currency (PCP) and the optimal monetary policy is characterized
by a model-derived reaction function which responds more aggressively to domestic
than to foreign productivity shocks. This monetary policy rule implies a flexible
exchange rate.
In the second equilibrium (LCP,LCP), all exporting firms, in both countries,
choose to price in the importer’s currency (LCP) and the optimal monetary pol-
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icy is characterized by a model-derived reaction function, which responds in larger
magnitude to foreign productivity shocks than domestic productivity shocks. This
monetary policy rule implies a flexible exchange rate (with lower volatility than in the
first equilibrium) or a pegged exchange rate depending on the Armington elasticity
of substitution values.
In the third equilibrium (LCP,PCP), all exporting firms, in one country, choose to
price in their own currency (PCP) and all the exporting firms, in the other country,
choose to price in the importer’s currency (LCP), the optimal monetary policy is
characterized by a model-derived reaction function, which responds to both domestic
and productivity shocks. This monetary policy rule implies a flexible exchange rate.
Third, unlike Bhattarai (2009), strategic complementarities is not a sufficient
condition to support the existence of the asymmetric Nash Equilibrium (LCP,PCP)
rather strategic substitution can be a sufficient condition to support this asymmetric
Nash equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I present the model. Then,
I introduce the methodology to determine the existence of the different Nash and
Cooperative Equilibria in this model. This is important because here we can see
an important application of the second order approximation method of the policy
function for solving complex DSGE models, such as the presented in this paper, which
do not have a closed form solution. Next, I present in detail the numerical model’s
results that support the theoretical results mentioned above. Finally, I conclude with
a summary of the main paper results and suggestions for further research.
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B. The Model
1. Environment
There are two identical countries, each one with the following features:
• Households live an infinite number of periods; they consume a basket of final
goods consisting of domestic and foreign goods.
• Households must use real balances to purchase final goods. (i.e. CIA constraint)
• There exists imperfect substitution in the consumption of domestic and foreign
goods.
• Households own all firms.
• There exists a continuum of firms. Each firm produces a final good by using
labor as input in a constant returns production function.
• The final goods market is characterized by monopolistic competition environ-
ment.
• Each firm sells the final good in both the domestic market and the foreign
market.
• Each firm sets the price one period prior to the period in which it sells the
final good. This means that firms have to set prices prior to observing certain
stochastic shocks.
• Firms can choose to set the price of its exported final product either in domestic
currency (PCP) or in foreign currency (LCP) through an endogenous price-
setting rule, which it will be described later.
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• The labor market is characterized by perfect competition. Labor is not tradable
across countries.
• There is a central bank which seeks to maximize, at time t, the present value
of the domestic representative household’s indirect utility function. In terms of
timing, firms set prices at time t-1 and the central bank reacts at time t.
• The money supply is determined by the central bank’s preannounced rule.
• The nominal exchange is determined by the balance of payments equilibrium.
• The source of uncertainty for each country is random labor productivity, deter-
mined by an exogenous stochastic process.
2. Households
Household j’s preferences are represented by the following lifetime utility function:
Et−1
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
Cτ (j)
1−σ
(1− σ) − κ
Nτ (j)
1+ψ
(1 + ψ)
]
(3.1)
where:
Ct(j) =
[
(χ)
1
αCH,t(j)
α−1
α + (1− χ) 1αCF,t(j)α−1α
] α
α−1
(3.2)
The parameter χ determines the consumer’s relative preference towards the home
good and the parameter α denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods consumption.
Also,
CH,t(j) =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(h, j)
1− 1
θ dh
) θ
θ−1
(3.3)
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CF,t(j) =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(f, j)
1− 1
θ df
) θ
θ−1
(3.4)
Ct(h, j) denotes household j’s consumption of home variety h, Ct(f, j) denotes house-
hold j’s consumption of foreign variety f and the parameter θ denotes the elasticity
of substitution across varieties.
CH,t(j) denotes household j’s aggregated consumption of domestic good, and CF,t(j)
denotes household j’s aggregated consumption of foreign good, Ct(j) is household j’s
optimal consumption basket at date t, and Nt(h) represents the household j’s worked
hours.
Household j chooses {Cτ (j), Nτ (j),Mτ (j), Bτ (j), B∗τ (j)}∞τ=t, which maximizes its
lifetime utility (3.1) subject to the following budget constraint:
Bt(j) + StB
∗
t (j) +Mt(j) ≤ (1 + it−1)Bt−1(j) + (1 + i∗t−1)StEtB∗t−1(j)+
Mt−1(j) +WtNt(j) + Tt(j) +
∫ 1
0
Πt(h)dh
− PtCt(j) (3.5)
PtCt(j) ≤Mt−1(j) + Tt (3.6)
where Mt−1(j), Tt(j), Pt,Πt(h),Wt, are taken as given, Tt(j) is a lump sum transfer
of money that household j receives from the monetary authority, Mt(j) is household
j’s demand for money holdings in home currency at time t for spending at t+1, Bt(j)
is household j’s demand for nominal bonds issued in domestic currency at time t,
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Pt denotes the home’s consumer price index, Wt is the real wage (deflated using the
consumer price index), it and i
∗
t are the domestic and foreign bonds nominal yields
paid at time t+1, and Πt(h) is the final goods producer h’s profit. The variables for
the foreign country are denoted with a star.
F.O.C
The first order conditions from the representative household’s maximization problem
are:
Ct : Ct(j)
−σ − Ptλt(j)− Ptµt(j) = 0 (3.7)
Nt(j) : −κNt(j)η + λt(j)Wt(j) = 0 (3.8)
Mt(j) : −λt(j) + βEt [λt+1(j) + µt+1(j)] = 0 (3.9)
Bt(j) : −λt(j) + (1 + it)βEt [λt+1(j)] = 0 (3.10)
B∗t (j) : −λt(j)St + (1 + i∗t )βEt [St+1λt+1(j)] = 0 (3.11)
a. International Risk Sharing
By the assumption of complete securities markets, similar countries, the first order
conditions (3.7),(3.10),(3.11) and the foreign analogous of (3.7), it follows that
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P ∗t St
Pt
=
(
Ct
C∗t
)σ
(3.12)
This is the efficient risk sharing condition used in international economy.
b. CPI Inflation
Given that household j has chosen {Ct(j)}∞t=0 previously, household j chooses at each
period t Ct(h, j) and Ct(f, j), which minimize its total expenditure
16:
PH,tCH,t(j) + PF,tCF,t(j) (3.13)
subject to (3.2).
The main results from this intratemporal minimization problem are the following:
• Household j’s demand for varieties h and f as a function of the relative price
and total consumption of domestic and foreign goods are given by:
Ct(h, j) =
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−θ
CH,t(j) (3.14)
Ct(f, j) =
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−θ
CF,t(j) (3.15)
• Household j’s total demands for the domestic and foreign goods are given by:
CH,t(j) = χ
(
PH,t
Pt
)−α
Ct(j) (3.16)
16Since the representative household preferences are separable on every period and
markets are complete, the intratemporal minimization problem can be solved inde-
pendently from the intertemporal maximization problem described previously.
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CF,t(j) = (1− χ)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−α
Ct(j) (3.17)
• Using (3.16),(3.17) and (3.13), the home country’s consumer price index is equal
to:
Pt =
[
χP 1−αH,t + (1− χ)P 1−αF,t
] 1
1−α (3.18)
where PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
pt(h)
1−θdh
] 1
1−θ
and PF,t =
[∫ 1
0
pt(f)
1−θdf
] 1
1−θ 17
3. Firms
Each variety h is produced by a single domestic firm and sold in both countries.
Producer h’s output is produced by using the following technology:
Yt(h) = AtNt(h) (3.19)
Yt(h) denotes the final good output produced by Home’s firm h, At is the Home’s
country-specific productivity process, where Aˆt = ρ ˆAt−1 + ut, Aˆt denotes Home’s
productivity deviations from its non stochastic steady state value and ut ∼ N(0,Σ).18
Since the final goods market is characterized by a monopolistic competition’s
environment, firms are able to set the price of their final goods, in both domestic and
foreign markets, to maximize their discounted expected profits.
• For the domestic market, we have:
17These expressions are obtained from: minimize
∫ 1
0
pt(h)Ct(h, j)dh subject to (3.3)
and minimize
∫ 1
0
pt(f)Ct(f, j)df subject to (3.4).
18Σ is a 2x2 variance-covariance matrix of two stochastic processes ut and u
∗
t , where
u∗t is the random component of the foreign country-specific productivity process.
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pt(h) = arg maxEt−1Qt−1,t [pt(h)−MCt(h)]
∫ 1
0
Ct(h, j)dj (3.20)
• For the foreign market, we have:
pft (h) = arg maxEt−1Qt−1,t [Stp
∗
t (h)−MCt(h)]
∫ 1
0
C∗t (h, j
∗)dj∗ (3.21)
Firms take the nominal price of labor, Wt, and the country-specific productivity
shock, At, as given.
Since all domestic firms are homogeneous, in equilibrium we have: pt(h) = PH,t
and p∗t (h) = P
∗
H,t. The same reasoning applies for the foreign firms. That is, in
equilibrium we have pt(f) = PF,t and p
∗
t (f) = P
∗
F,t.
Here, pft (h) is the price of exported good set by the producer. This price can
be set either in domestic money or in foreign currency. Here, p∗t (h) is the price that
firm h receives at the moment of selling its final good and it is the price that foreign
consumers pay for the domestic good produced by firm h. MCt(h) is the nominal
marginal cost of firm h, which can be represented by the following expression:
MCt(h) = Wt/At (3.22)
In order to understand the currency-invoicing rule, we need the following defini-
tions.
• If pft (h) is set in domestic currency, p∗t (h) ≡ pft (h)/St. That is , if a US exporting
firm sets its price in USD, the foreign consumer (say France) will pay p∗t (h) which
is denominated in EURO.
• If pft (h) is set in foreign currency, p∗t (h) ≡ pft (h). That is , if a US exporting
firm sets its price in EURO, the foreign consumer, say France, will pay p∗t (h)
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which is also denominated in EURO.
a. Currency Choice - PCP vs. LCP
The decision rule that firm h uses for invoicing its exports in either domestic currency
or foreign currency is the same as proposed by Devereux et al. (2004).
Definition 1. Let η be a function from < → {0, 1} such that:
η = 1 if
{
Et−1Qt−1,tΠPCPt > Et−1Qt−1,tΠ
LCP
t
}
(3.23)
Definition 2.
p∗t (h) ≡ pft (h)/Sηt (3.24)
Unlike Corsetti and Pesenti (2004), expression (3.23) can take only two values,
one or zero. Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) allowed intermediate values such as η = 0.5
and in these cases it is no clear to determine whether a exporting firm sets its good
price in domestic or in foreign currency.
Let me to cite the following proposition showed by Devereux et al. (2004)
Proposition 1. The domestic firm h sets its price for the foreign market in domestic
(foreign) currency if [
V ar(St)
2
− cov(MCt, St)
]
> 0, (< 0) (3.25)
Proof. See Appendix
As Devereux et al. (2004) showed, this proposition is the result of comparing up
to second order the expected profit that the exporting firm has when it sets its price
in domestic (PCP) or in foreign currency (LCP). An important assumption in this
proposition is that every firm h takes the stochastic discount factor as given. The
idea is that actions by individual firms have a negligible impact on the market.
45
Corollary 1.
η = 1
{[
V ar(St)
2
− cov(MCt, St)
]
> 0
}
(3.26)
Corollary 2. The foreign firm f sets its price for the domestic market in foreign
(domestic) currency if [
V ar(St)
2
+ cov(MC∗t , St)
]
> 0, (< 0) (3.27)
Corollary 3.
η∗ = 1
{[
V ar(St)
2
+ cov(MC∗t , St)
]
> 0
}
(3.28)
4. Monetary Authority
The monetary authority transfers to households a lump sum transfer of money.
Tt = Mt −Mt−1 (3.29)
In contrast with Devereux et al. (2004) and Bhattarai (2009), the money supply
in this model is determined optimally by the monetary authority at time t, one period
after the exporting firms have set their prices. The monetary authorities are able to
commit to the preannounced rule:
Mt = M (At, A
∗
t , νd, νf ) (3.30)
M∗t = M
∗ (At, A∗t , ν∗d , ν∗f) (3.31)
where At is the country-specific productivity process for the Home country and A
∗
t
is the country-specific productivity process for the Foreign country. A and A∗ de-
notes the non-stochastic steady state value for the productivity of Home and Foreign
country respectively, the parameter νd denotes the monetary authority’s degree of re-
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sponse to domestic productivity shocks, while the parameter νf denotes the monetary
authority’s degree of response to foreign productivity shocks. The ν ′s are determined
optimally by a benevolent monetary authority who seeks to maximize the represen-
tative household’s indirect welfare function. That is:
{νd, νf} = arg maxEt−1
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
C˜τ
1−σ
(1− σ) − κ
N˜τ
1+ψ
(1 + ψ)
]
(3.32)
where C˜t and N˜t are the model’s policy functions.
5. Equilibrium Conditions
The physical constraint for variety h is:
Yt(h) ≥
∫ 1
0
Ct(h, j)dj +
∫ 1
0
C∗t (h, j
∗)dj∗ (3.33)
The physical constraint for variety f is:
Yt(f) ≥
∫ 1
0
Ct(f, j)dj +
∫ 1
0
C∗t (f, j
∗)dj∗ (3.34)
The domestic labor market constraint is:
∫ 1
0
Nt(j)dj ≥
∫ 1
0
Nt(h)dh (3.35)
The foreign labor market constraint is:
∫ 1
0
N∗t (j)dj
∗ ≥
∫ 1
0
N∗t (h)dh
∗ (3.36)
The international bonds constraints are:
∫ 1
0
Bt(j)dj +
∫ 1
0
Bt(j
∗)dj∗ = 0 (3.37)
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∫ 1
0
B∗t (j)dj +
∫ 1
0
B∗t (j
∗)dj∗ = 0 (3.38)
C. Methodology to Find the Nash and the Cooperative Equilibria
1. Nash Equilibria
This strategic situation can be described as a dynamic game in which firms in the
two countries set their prices at time t-1, each country’s central bank precommits at
time t-1 with an optimal monetary policy rule, which responds to both domestic and
foreign productivity shocks at time t by taking the firms’ pricing decision and the
other country’s central bank’s reaction function as given.
The first step is to make a second order expansion of the Central Bank’s objective
function,(3.32), since it is computational burdensome to solve (3.32) by methodologies
such as iterating on the Bellman equation.19
Therefore,
Wt−1 ≈
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
C−σEt−1(C˜t − C)− σ
2
C−σ−1Et−1(C˜t − C)2...
−NψEt−1(N˜t −N)− ψ
2
Nψ−1Et−1(N˜t −N)2
]
(3.39)
Since markets are complete and C˜t and N˜t policy functions depend on ν
′s and
productivity shocks, by applying the iterated expectations law to (3.39), the Central
Bank’s optimization problem turns into:
19In chapter 6, Woodford (2003) argues why the expansion of (3.32) should be up
to second order.
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{νH , νF} = arg max
[
C−σE0(C˜t − C)− σ
2
C−σ−1E0(C˜t − C)2...
−NψE0(N˜t −N)− ψ
2
Nψ−1E0(N˜t −N)2
]
(3.40)
where X denotes the non-stochastic steady state value of Xt, X˜t denotes Xt’s policy
function, and Xt = {Ct, Nt}.
The second step is to solve the model described in the previous section by using
the second order approximation method of the policy function.20 21 22
The third step is to solve simultaneously the optimization problem (3.40) for
each country’s Central Bank providing that all firms in each country have decided
to set their prices either in domestic currency or in foreign currency (i.e. we impose
an initial exporting firms’ currency-invoicing decision). The solution algorithm is the
following:
• Pick some initial values for the parameters νH , νF , ν∗H and ν∗F .
• Use the calibrated parameters, shown in the appendix, to solve the model.
• Solve the model by the method described in the second step.
20Instead of using the standard linearization method, I use the second order ap-
proximation method of the policy function to avoid the spurious results described
by Kim and Kim (2003). These authors show that if they evaluate the second order
approximation of the welfare function by using only first order approximation of the
policy function in a two-country SDGE model, then the economics welfare is higher
under autarky than under free world trade. This spurious result contradicts the first
welfare theorem.
21The method for computing the unconditional moments from the second order
approximation of this model is the perturbations method implemented in DYNARE
by Collard and Juillard (2001). DYNARE is matlab’s toolbox developed by Maurice
Julliard and Fabrice Collard. To get more information about this software, please
follow the link: http://www.dynare.org/.
22The model’s calibration is provided in the appendix.
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• Get the unconditional first two moments for the variables Ct and Nt and plug
them into each country’s central bank welfare function.
• Obtain the optimal values for νH , νF , which maximizes the welfare function
(3.40) for the domestic country given the initial values of ν∗H and ν
∗
F .
• Obtain the optimal values for ν∗H , ν∗F , which maximizes the welfare function
(3.40) for the foreign country given the values of νH and νF that were obtained
in the previous item.
• Repeat the last two steps until the norm of ν ′s vector reach a convergence
criterion defined by the researcher.23
The fourth step is to check if the solution obtained from the above steps is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We need to check if the exporting firms currency-
invoicing decisions, determined by (3.25) and (3.27), are the same as those taken as
given by the Central Bank at the moment of choosing its own v′.24
2. Cooperative Equilibria
This strategic situation can be described as a dynamic game in which firms, in both
countries, set their prices at time t-1, each country’s central bank precommits at
time t-1 with an optimal monetary policy rule, which responds to both domestic and
foreign productivity shocks at time t by taking as given the firms’ pricing decision as
given. Unlike the non-cooperative case, here both central banks want to choose their
optimal monetary policy such that they maximize aggregate world welfare. That is:
23In this paper, I set a convergence criterion of 10e-5.
24To know this firm’s currency-invoicing decision, we need to obtain from the
model’s solution the following unconditional moments cov(MCt, St) , cov(MC
∗
t , St)
and var(St) and plug them in (3.25) and (3.27).
50
{
νd, νf , ν
∗
d, ν
∗
f
}
= arg maxEt−1
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tζ
[
C˜1−στ
(1− σ) − κ
N˜1+ψτ
(1 + ψ)
]
+
(1− ζ)
[
(C˜∗τ )
1−σ
(1− σ) − κ
(N˜∗τ )
1+ψ
(1 + ψ)
]
(3.41)
where ζ denotes each country’s bargaining power25, X denotes the non-stochastic
steady state value ofXt and X˜t denotesXt’s policy function andXt = {Ct, Nt, C∗t , N∗t }
Since markets are complete and C˜t,N˜t,C˜
∗
t ,N˜
∗
t policy functions depend on ν
′s and
productivity shocks, by approximating (3.41) up to second order and by applying the
iterated expectations law to (3.41), the Central Banks’ jointly optimization problem
turns into:
{
νd, νf , ν
∗
d, ν
∗
f
}
= arg max ζ
[
C−σE0(C˜t − C)− σ
2
C−σ−1E0(C˜t − C)2...
−NψE0(N˜t −N)− ψ
2
Nψ−1E0(N˜t −N)2
]
+(1− ζ)
[
(C∗)−σE0(C˜∗t − C∗)−
σ
2
(C∗)−σ−1E0(C˜∗t − C∗)2...
−(N∗)ψE0(N˜∗t −N∗)−
ψ
2
(N∗)ψ−1E0(N˜∗t −N∗)2
]
(3.42)
The two first steps to find the cooperative equilibria are the same as those de-
scribed in the previous subsection. However, the third step changes a little bit with
respect to the described in the previous subsection. That is:
• Pick up some initial values for the parameters νH , νF , ν∗H and ν∗F .
• Use the calibrated parameters, shown in the appendix, to solve the model.
25In this paper I assume that both countries has the same bargaining power even
when they have different size. The reason of this assumption is to understand how
the country size affects the monetary cooperation gains for each country.
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• Solve the model by the method described in the second step.
• Get the unconditional first two moments for the variables Ct,Nt,C∗t ,N∗t and plug
them in each country’s central bank welfare function.
• Obtain the optimal values for νH , νF , ν∗H , ν∗F , which maximizes the welfare
function (3.42).
The fourth step is to evaluate if the solution obtained above is a cooperative
equilibrium. To evaluate it, we need check that the exporting firms currency-invoicing
decisions, determined by (3.25) and (3.27), are the same as the taken as given by the
central banks at the moment of choosing their own v′.26
D. Theoretical Results
In this section, I present the theoretical results obtained by this model under different
combination of preferences, Armington elasticities of substitution and international
monetary policy strategies (uncoordinated and coordinated international monetary
policy)
1. Loglinear Preferences
When preferences are logarithmic in consumption, (σ = 1), linear in labor, (ψ = 0)
and the Armington elasticity of substitution is equal to one,(α = 1), this model
replicates the following theoretical results derived analytically by Corsetti and Pesenti
(2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
26To know this firm’s currency-invoicing decision, we need to obtain from the
model’s solution the following unconditional moments cov(MCt, St) , cov(MC
∗
t , St)
and var(St) and plug them in (3.25) and (3.27).
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Table IX.
Nash Equilibria, when σ = 1, and ψ = 0
Invoice Invoice
α Home Foreign νd νf ν
∗
d ν
∗
f sd(St) E(U) E(U
∗)
0.25 PCP PCP 1.6045 -0.6045 -0.6045 1.6045 6.17 -3.4316 -3.4316
0.50 PCP PCP 1.1552 -0.1552 -0.1552 1.1552 3.66 -3.1287 -3.1287
0.70 PCP PCP 1.0456 -0.0456 -0.0456 1.0456 3.05 -2.9256 -2.9256
0.85 PCP PCP 1.0105 -0.0105 -0.0105 1.0105 2.85 -2.7781 -2.7781
1.00 PCP PCP 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.79 -2.6316 -2.6316
1.00 LCP LCP 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.00 -2.8171 -2.8171
1.30 PCP PCP 1.0427 -0.0427 -0.0427 1.0427 3.03 -2.3404 -2.3404
1.30 LCP LCP 0.4325 0.5675 0.5675 0.4325 0.38 -2.5832 -2.5832
1.50 PCP PCP 1.1364 -0.1364 -0.1364 1.1364 3.56 -2.1641 -2.1641
1.50 LCP LCP 0.3875 0.6125 0.6125 0.3875 0.63 -2.4311 -2.4311
2.00 LCP LCP 0.2750 0.7250 0.7250 0.2750 1.26 -2.0638 -2.0638
2.00 PCP LCP -0.1136 1.1136 -1.3030 2.3030 3.32 -2.6571 -2.4006
2.20 PCP LCP -0.4975 1.4976 -2.9673 3.9673 6.90 -6.1724 -2.4735
3.00 LCP LCP 0.0500 0.9500 0.9500 0.0500 2.52 -1.3857 -1.3857
4.00 LCP LCP -0.1750 1.1750 1.1750 -0.1750 3.77 -0.7827 -0.7827
5.00 LCP LCP -0.4000 1.4000 1.4000 -0.4000 5.03 -0.2548 -0.2548
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Table X.
Cooperative Equilibria, when σ = 1, and ψ = 0
Invoice Invoice Gains from
α Home Foreign νd νf ν
∗
d ν
∗
f sd(St) E(U) E(U
∗) Coop. (%)
0.25 PCP PCP 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.79 -3.3638 -3.3638 1.9750
0.50 PCP PCP 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.79 -3.1197 -3.1197 0.2850
0.70 PCP PCP 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.79 -2.9245 -2.9245 0.0360
0.85 PCP PCP 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.79 -2.7780 -2.7780 0.0020
1.00 PCP PCP 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.79 -2.6316 -2.6316 0.0000
1.00 LCP LCP 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.00 -2.8171 -2.8171 0.0000
1.30 PCP PCP 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.79 -2.3387 -2.3387 0.0750
1.30 LCP LCP 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.00 -2.5798 -2.5798 0.1309
1.50 PCP PCP 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.79 -2.1434 -2.1434 0.9563
1.50 LCP LCP 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.00 -2.4217 -2.4217 0.3863
2.00 LCP LCP 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.00 -2.0263 -2.0263 1.8201
3.00 LCP LCP 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.00 -1.2354 -1.2354 79.980
4.00 LCP LCP 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.00 -0.4446 -0.4446 67.910
5.00 LCP LCP 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.00 0.3462 0.3462 144.220
First, by comparing Tables IX and X we can see that there are not gains from
international monetary cooperation when the Armington elasticity of substitution is
equal to one. This result is independent of the invoicing currency chosen by exporting
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firms.27
Second, in Table IX we can see that when the Armington elasticity of substitution
is equal to one, there are two Nash Equilibria. The first equilibrium (PCP,PCP), is
characterized by all exporting firms, in both countries, choosing to price in their own
currency (PCP) and the optimal monetary policy is characterized by a model-derived
reaction function which responds more aggressively to domestic than to foreign pro-
ductivity shocks. This monetary policy rule implies a flexible exchange rate. The
second equilibrium (LCP,LCP), is characterized by all the exporting firms, in both
countries, choosing to price in the importer’s currency (LCP) and the optimal mone-
tary policy is characterized by a model-derived reaction function, which responds in
similar magnitude to both foreign and domestic productivity shocks. This monetary
policy rule implies a pegged exchange rate.
Nevertheless, when the Armington elasticity of substitution is not equal to one,
the theoretical results derived analytically by Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) and Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005) do not hold. First, by comparing Tables IX and (X) we can
see that there are positive gains from international monetary cooperation when the
Armington elasticity of substitution is different from one. This result is independent
of the currency invoicing choice made by exporting firms. Furthermore, in Table IX
we can see that when the Armington elasticity of substitution is quite far from one,
positive gains from international monetary cooperation becomes more significant.
For example, when the Armington elasticity of substitution is equal to 0.25 or 5,
the representative household expected welfare increases in 2% or 144% respectively.
However, when the Armington elasticity is equal to 0.85 or 1.3, the representative
27These results are not demonstrated by a formal proof here but they can be ob-
tained by solving numerically this model. This numerical solution is provided in this
paper’s matlab code, which is available upon request.
55
household expected welfare increases in 0% or 0.07% respectively.
Second, in Table IX we can see that when the Armington elasticity of substitution
is less than one, there is a unique and symmetric Nash Equilibrium. This Nash
equilibrium (PCP,PCP), is characterized by all exporting firms, in both countries,
choosing to price in their own currency (PCP) and the optimal monetary policy is
characterized by a model-derived reaction function which responds more aggressively
to domestic than foreign productivity shocks. This monetary policy rule implies a
flexible exchange rate.
Third, in Table IX we can see that when the Armington elasticity of substitution
is larger and equal than one, there are multiple Nash Equilibria. The first Nash equi-
librium (PCP,PCP) has the same features as the previously described. The second
Nash equilibrium (LCP,LCP), is characterized by all exporting firms, in both coun-
tries, choosing to price in the importer’s currency (LCP) and the optimal monetary
policy is characterized by a model-derived reaction function, which responds in larger
(except when α = 1) magnitude to foreign productivity shocks than domestic produc-
tivity shocks. This monetary policy rule implies a flexible exchange rate (with lower
volatility than in the first equilibrium) or a pegged exchange rate depending on the
Armington elasticity of substitution value. The third Nash equilibrium (LCP,PCP)
is characterized by all exporting firms, in one country, choosing to price in their own
currency (PCP) and all exporting firms, in the other country, choosing to price in
the importer’s currency (LCP), the optimal monetary policy is characterized by a
model-derived reaction function, which responds to both domestic and productivity
shocks. This monetary policy rule implies a flexible exchange rate.
Fourth, in Table IX, we can see, for different Armington elasticities of substitu-
tion values, that the (PCP,PCP) Nash equilibrium Pareto dominates the (LCP,LCP)
Nash equilibrium.
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2. CRRA Preferences and Same Country Size
When preferences are represented by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function, most of the above theoretical results still hold. Furthermore, under these
general preferences, I find two additional new results in international macroeconomics
literature. First, when the Armington elasticity of substitution is different from one
but equal to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in total consumption and
all exporting firms, in both countries, invoice their exports in their own currency
(PCP,PCP), there are no gains from international monetary cooperation. Second,
theoretical results obtained by Bhattarai (2009) do not hold in this model. For exam-
ple, strategic complementarities σ + ψ < 1, as defined by Steinsson (2008) is not the
only sufficient condition to support the asymmetric Nash equilibrium (PCP,LCP),
in which all exporting firms, in one country, choose to price in their own currency
(PCP) and all the exporting firms, in the other country, choose to price in the im-
porter’s currency (LCP). Instead, strategic substitution σ + ψ > 1 can also support
the asymmetric Nash equilibrium (PCP,LCP).
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Table XI.
Nash Equilibria, when σ = 0.3, and ψ = 0.3
Invoice Invoice
α Home Foreign νd νf ν
∗
d ν
∗
f sd(St) E(U) E(U
∗)
0.50 PCP PCP 1.8961 0.2706 0.2706 1.8961 4.54 -0.6903 -0.6903
0.70 PCP PCP 1.7116 0.4550 0.4550 1.7116 3.51 -0.4355 -0.4355
0.85 PCP PCP 1.6346 0.5321 0.5321 1.6346 3.08 -0.2703 -0.2703
1.00 PCP PCP 1.5833 0.5833 0.5833 1.5833 2.79 -0.0418 -0.0418
1.00 LCP LCP 1.0833 1.0833 1.0833 1.0833 0.00 -0.1250 -0.1250
1.30 PCP PCP 1.5213 0.6454 0.6454 1.5213 2.45 0.1498 0.1498
1.30 LCP LCP 1.0293 1.1374 1.1374 1.0293 0.27 -0.1393 -0.1393
1.50 PCP PCP 1.4960 0.6706 0.6706 1.4960 2.31 0.3106 0.3106
1.50 LCP LCP 0.9969 1.1697 1.1697 0.9969 0.44 -0.0093 -0.0093
2.00 LCP LCP 0.9268 1.2399 1.2399 0.9268 0.80 0.2714 0.2714
2.00 PCP LCP 0.5842 1.5825 0.5316 1.6350 0.14 0.4095 -0.0704
2.20 PCP LCP 0.5105 1.6562 0.4718 1.6948 0.10 0.5521 -0.0805
3.00 LCP LCP 0.8196 1.3471 1.3471 0.8196 1.34 0.6956 0.6956
3.00 PCP LCP 0.1996 1.9670 0.1728 1.9939 0.07 1.0826 -0.3460
4.00 LCP LCP 0.7417 1.4250 1.4250 0.7417 1.74 1.0010 1.0010
4.00 PCP LCP -0.2395 2.4061 -0.3299 2.4966 0.23 1.6301 -1.1205
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Table XII.
Cooperative Equilibria, when σ = 0.3, and ψ = 0.3
Invoice Invoice Gains from
α Home Foreign νd νf ν
∗
d ν
∗
f sd(St) E(U) E(U
∗) Coop. (%)
0.50 PCP PCP 1.65 0.52 0.52 1.65 3.16 -0.6645 -0.6645 3.74
0.70 PCP PCP 1.62 0.55 0.55 1.62 3.00 -0.4303 -0.4303 1.18
0.85 PCP PCP 1.60 0.57 0.57 1.60 2.89 -0.2694 -0.2694 0.32
1.00 PCP PCP 1.58 0.58 0.58 1.58 2.79 -0.0418 -0.0418 0.00
1.00 LCP LCP 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 0.00 -0.1250 -0.1250 0.00
1.30 PCP PCP 1.55 0.62 0.62 1.55 2.61 0.1509 0.1509 0.78
1.30 PCP PCP 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 0.00 -0.1386 -0.1386 0.46
1.50 PCP PCP 1.53 0.64 0.64 1.53 2.51 0.3126 0.3126 0.65
1.50 LCP LCP 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 0.00 -0.0076 -0.0076 17.67
2.00 LCP LCP 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 0.00 0.2768 0.2768 1.99
3.00 LCP LCP 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 0.00 0.7109 0.7109 2.20
4.00 LCP LCP 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 0.00 1.0267 1.0267 2.56
By comparing Tables XI and XII, we can see that for different Armington elas-
ticity of substitution values and under strategic complementarities (e.g σ = 0.3 and
ψ = 0.3), there are positive gains from international monetary cooperation.
In addition, in Table XI we can see that for different Armington elasticity of sub-
stitution values which are less than one, there exists only a unique Nash equilibrium,
(PCP,PCP), while for Armington elasticity of substitution values larger and equal
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than one, there exist multiple Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we can see also in Table
XI that expected welfare associated to (PCP,PCP) Nash equilibrium is larger than
that of the (LCP,LCP).
Table XIII.
Nash Equilibria, when σ = 2, and ψ = 1
Invoice Invoice
α Home Foreign νd νf ν
∗
d ν
∗
f sd(St) E(U) E(U
∗)
0.50 PCP PCP 1.0000 -0.3333 -0.3333 1.0000 3.73 -4.3913 -4.3913
0.70 PCP PCP 0.8964 -0.2297 -0.2297 0.8964 3.15 -4.0852 -4.0852
0.85 PCP PCP 0.8577 -0.1910 -0.1910 0.8577 2.93 -3.8985 -3.8985
1.00 PCP PCP 0.8333 -0.1667 -0.1667 0.8333 2.79 -5.9363 -5.9363
1.00 LCP LCP 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.00 -6.5260 -6.5260
1.30 PCP PCP 0.8017 -0.1350 -0.1350 0.8017 2.62 -3.4871 -3.4871
1.30 LCP LCP 0.2991 0.3675 0.3675 0.2991 0.24 -3.9063 -3.9063
1.50 PCP PCP 0.7845 -0.1178 -0.1178 0.7845 2.52 -3.3559 -3.3559
1.50 LCP LCP 0.2809 0.3858 0.3858 0.2809 0.37 -3.7985 -3.7985
2.00 PCP PCP 0.7417 -0.0751 -0.0750 0.7416 2.28 -3.1131 -3.1131
2.00 LCP LCP 0.2460 0.4207 0.4207 0.2460 0.61 -3.5946 -3.5946
3.00 LCP LCP 0.2023 0.4644 0.4644 0.2023 0.92 -3.3448 -3.3448
4.00 LCP LCP 0.1761 0.4906 0.4906 0.1761 1.10 -3.1977 -3.1977
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Table XIV.
Cooperative Equilibria, when σ = 2, and ψ = 1
Invoice Invoice Gains from
α Home Foreign νd νf ν
∗
d ν
∗
f sd(St) E(U) E(U
∗) Coop. (%)
0.50 PCP PCP 1.00 -0.33 -0.33 1.00 3.73 -4.3913 -4.3913 0.0000
0.70 PCP PCP 0.92 -0.25 -0.25 0.92 3.29 -4.0846 -4.0846 0.0137
0.85 PCP PCP 0.87 -0.21 -0.21 0.87 3.02 -3.8982 -3.8982 0.0079
1.00 PCP PCP 0.83 -0.17 -0.17 0.83 2.79 -5.9363 -5.9363 0.0000
1.00 LCP LCP 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 -6.5260 -6.5260 0.0000
1.30 PCP PCP 0.77 -0.10 -0.10 0.77 2.43 -3.4846 -3.4846 0.0718
1.30 LCP LCP 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 -3.9045 -3.9045 0.0445
1.50 PCP PCP 0.73 -0.07 -0.07 0.73 2.24 -3.3486 -3.3486 0.2172
1.50 LCP LCP 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 -3.7944 -3.7944 0.1075
2.00 PCP PCP 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.67 1.86 -3.0880 -3.0880 0.8051
2.00 LCP LCP 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 -3.5832 -3.5832 0.3156
3.00 LCP LCP 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 -3.3193 -3.3193 0.7631
4.00 LCP LCP 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 -3.1610 -3.1610 1.1494
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By comparing Tables XIII and XIV, we can see that for different Armington
elasticity of substitution values and under strategic substitution (e.g σ = 2 and ψ =
1), there are positive gains from international monetary cooperation. However, when
α = 0.5 we can see that gains from international monetary cooperation are equal to
zero.
Furthermore, for many combinations of α and σ such that α = 1
σ
and all exporting
firms, in both countries, invoice their exports in their own currency (PCP,PCP), it is
possible to find numerically that gains from international monetary cooperation are
equal to zero.28
In addition, in Table XV we can see that unlike Bhattarai (2009) the asymmetric
Nash equilibrium (LCP,PCP) can be also supported under strategic substitution (i.e.
when σ+ψ > 1) and when the Armington elasticity of substitution takes values equal
to 2 or 2.2.
28The matlab’s code to check this result can be provided by the author upon re-
quest.
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Table XV.
Nash Equilibria, when σ = 1, and ψ = 0.5
Invoice Invoice
α Home Foreign νd νf ν
∗
d ν
∗
f sd(St) E(U) E(U
∗)
0.50 PCP PCP 1.2207 -0.2207 -0.2207 1.2207 4.03 -3.2241 -3.2241
0.70 PCP PCP 1.0844 -0.0844 -0.0844 1.0844 3.27 -2.9576 -2.9576
0.85 PCP PCP 1.0319 -0.0319 -0.0319 1.0319 2.97 -2.7858 -2.7858
1.00 PCP PCP 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.79 -2.6316 -2.6316
1.00 LCP LCP 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.00 -2.9098 -2.9098
1.30 PCP PCP 0.9668 0.0332 0.0332 0.9668 2.61 -2.3655 -2.3655
1.30 LCP LCP 0.4509 0.5491 0.5491 0.4509 0.27 -2.6959 -2.6959
1.50 PCP PCP 0.9555 0.0445 0.0445 0.9555 2.55 -2.2146 -2.2146
1.50 LCP LCP 0.4229 0.5771 0.5771 0.4229 0.43 -2.5753 -2.5753
2.00 PCP PCP 0.9386 0.0607 0.0613 0.9382 2.45 -1.9113 -1.9115
2.00 LCP LCP 0.3650 0.6350 0.6350 0.3650 0.75 -2.3302 -2.3302
2.00 PCP LCP 0.4044 0.5956 -0.2636 1.2636 1.87 -2.2687 -2.0645
2.20 LCP LCP 0.3457 0.6543 0.6543 0.3457 0.86 -2.2496 -2.2496
2.20 PCP LCP 0.3956 0.6044 -0.3032 1.3032 1.95 -2.1923 -1.9438
3.00 LCP LCP 0.2840 0.7160 0.7160 0.2840 1.21 -1.9955 -1.9955
4.00 LCP LCP 0.2300 0.7700 0.7700 0.2300 1.51 -1.7777 -1.7777
63
E. Conclusion
In a model of endogenous invoicing and endogenous monetary policy, I have found,
first, that gains from international monetary cooperation between two countries are
different from zero when the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods consumption (Armington elasticity of substitution) is different from one.
Second, I have found also that when the Armington elasticity of substitution is
less than one, this model predicts a unique Nash equilibrium, in which all exporting
firms in both countries choose to price in their own currency and the central bank’s
optimal monetary policy implies a flexible exchange rate. However, this model pre-
dicts multiple Nash equilibria, when the Armington elasticity of substitution is larger
and equal than one.
Third, I have also found that strategic complementarities, defined by Steinsson
(2008), is not the only sufficient condition to support the existence of asymmetric
Nash Equilibria such as (LCP,PCP) or (PCP,LCP). Furthermore, these asymmetric
Nash equilibria can be supported under strategic substitution. (i.e. when σ+ψ < 1)
Fourth, under different sets of preferences and elasticities of substitution val-
ues, this model confirms theoretical results obtained previously in the international
macroeconomics literature, (see Devereux and Engel (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti
(2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)) such as that (PCP,PCP) Nash Equilibrium
Pareto dominates the (LCP,LCP) Nash Equilibrium.
This model can be extended for different country sizes. In particular, this requires
to deal with the risk sharing condition constant and to model a Nash Bargaining
solution to determine the optimal international monetary policy under coordination
as long as the different-country size assumption implies different units of welfare
measure for each country.
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Finally, it is also important to incorporate segmented markets into this model
to determine endogenously which fraction of exporting firms set their prices either in
domestic or in foreign currency. This idea is motivated from Fukuda (1994) who says
that firms are indifferent to price their exports in domestic or foreign currency when
they have access to futures market.
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CHAPTER IV
SPOT PRICE RETURNS FORECAST EVALUATION FOR ALUMINUM
TRADED AT LONDON METAL EXCHANGE
A. Introduction
Commodity price forecasters frequently use commodity futures contracts’ prices as
commodity spot prices’ predictor. For instance, Bopp and Sitzer (1987), Gurcan
(1998), Swanson and Zeng (1998) and Abosedra and Baghestani (2004) conclude
that crude oil futures prices are unbiased and efficient predictors of crude oil spot
price. However, important works such as Fama and French (1987) and Alquist and
Kilian (2010) conclude the opposite. In the case of metals and agricultural products,
Chinn and Coibion (2010) found that futures prices of those products are good predic-
tors of their respective spot prices while Bernard et al. (2008) found that aluminum
futures contracts’ prices yield most of the times out-of-sample forecasting errors, for
aluminum future spot prices, than those made by a No-drift Random Walk Model.29
During the last 20 years, aluminum has become a very popular input for produc-
ing cars, airplanes, buildings, beverages cans, and diverse appliances, see Sander and
Slatter (2008). This aluminum popularity has been reflected in its high consumption
growth rate of 3.1% and 5% during the 90’s and the last five years respectively, see
Luo and Soria (2008). Because of this aluminum’s leaning, its market,now, is more
exposed to diverse uncertainty shocks and, therefore, to have highly volatile prices. In
order to hedge against aluminum spot price volatility risk, speculators and aluminum
consumers (in this case final good firms) arrange into forward or futures contracts.
29Chinn and Coibion (2010) included metals such as gold, silver, aluminum, copper,
lead, nickel and tin.
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Aluminum futures contracts are mainly traded either at the London Exchange Met-
als (LME) or at the New York Stock Exchange (NYMEX). Unlike other commodities
markets such as oil and energy, there are few authors that have been studied alu-
minum futures prices role as a predictor of the aluminum spot price. Among those
authors, Heaney (2002) shows, by using autoregressive models, that model testing
ability of futures prices to forecast subsequent spot prices with models based on Car-
rying Costs Theory have lesser forecast mean squared error than those models that
are not based on Carrying Cost Theory. By using other approach, Bernard et al.
(2008) used stochastic models such as Random Walks, ARCHs, GARCHs and Factor
models to evaluate the aluminum futures contracts’ prices efficiency as an aluminum
spot price predictor. They found that mean-reverting models with stochastic conve-
nience yields have a better out of sample forecast performance than those competing
models.
One caveat about the above conclusions is that they are based on ordinal com-
parisons among one-step ahead forecast expected loss functions (e.g. Mean Squared
Error or Mean Absolute Error) rather than statistical testing comparisons between
forecasts loss functions. In fact, these conclusions can dramatically change if not only
consider the forecasting loss function’s expected value but also its variance. That is,
one can have a model producing the lowest mean squared forecasting error but with
very volatile squared forecasting errors. To avoid these ordinal comparisons between
forecasting loss functions’ expected value, Otto (2011), by using an alternative ap-
proach, found evidences to not reject the null hypothesis of speculative efficiency that
LME metals futures contract’ prices does have to predict their respective spot price.30
30Speculative efficiency hypothesis means that under the condition of risk neutrality
and zero transaction costs, the future spot price at t+h is equal to the future contract
price at t, whose maturity is at t+ h, plus a zero mean i.i.d random variable.
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In that paper Otto (2011) instead of using out of sample errors forecast evaluations
to test futures prices performance in predicting spot prices, she used ARMA’s family
models to test the influence of the present and past forecast errors, for 3 and 15
months futures contracts, on the future forecast error for six base metals traded at
LME.31
In this paper, we propose six econometric models to predict the aluminum spot
price monthly return and test statistically their prediction performance at 3, 15 and
27 steps-ahead-forecasts. The first model is a No-drift Random Walk, which has been
broadly used in the forecasting evaluation literature, see Alquist and Kilian (2010),
Swanson and Zeng (1998), Fama and French (1987) and so on. The second model is
based on the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis of futures contracts’ prices to predict
spot prices, provided by Bilson (1981). This model implies a single equation that
relates the spot price at period t+h with the futures contract price at period t, which
matures at period t+h. That is, if we have a 3-months future contract, the Speculative
Efficiency Hypothesis model is represented by the spot price as a function of the 3
month futures price three months ago as long as we are using monthly data. The
third model, based on the Financial Cost of Carry Theory, is a VAR in differences
which has three endogenous variables: spot price, futures price and risk free rate.
Since we found that aluminum futures prices, spot prices and treasury bills interest
rates are cointegrated (see this paper appendix for more details), the fourth model is
a VECM, which has these three latest variables.
The fifth model, based on the Storage Cost of Carry Theory, assumes that rather
than having a commodity for hedging risk or speculation, there is an unobservable
benefit of having the commodity, which can be represented as a function of the in-
31These six base metals are zinc, aluminum, cooper, tin, nickel and lead.
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ventories and the spot price volatility. For more details see Pindyck (2001).32 Here,
we represent this storage cost model through a VAR in differences, which has five en-
dogenous variables: spot price, futures price, risk-free asset interest rate, inventories
and spot price volatility. Since we found that aluminum futures prices, spot prices,
inventories, spot price volatility and treasury bills interest rates are cointegrated (see
this paper appendix for more details), the sixth model is a VECM, which has these
five latest variables.
In contrast to most of the commodity forecasting evaluation literature, our pre-
dictive ability (or forecasting performance) evaluations are not mainly based on ordi-
nal comparisons between two models’ expected loss functions. Instead, our forecasting
performance evaluations are based on both unconditional and conditional prediction
ability tests proposed by Giacomini and White (2006). The use of these tests have
a great advantage over traditional ability prediction tests such as Diebold and Mari-
ano (1995) tests because they allow to test predictive ability not only for non-nested
models but also for nested models. As an example of nested models’ forecasting per-
formance evaluation, in this paper, is the comparison in conditional and unconditional
forecasting performance between the Financial Cost of Carry vs. the Storage Cost
models.
By using Giacomini and White (2006) predictive ability tests, we find that, for
both 3 and 15 months ahead forecast, Storage Cost models does not improve the
aluminum spot price monthly return’s forecast with respect to the Financial Cost of
32This theory assumes that there is a benefit of having physical ownership of the
commodity [see Brennan (1958) and Working (1949) for more details]. This benefit
is called the convenience yield. Also, this theory assumes that there is a variable
storage cost associated with storing the commodity until the expiration of the futures
contract. As a result, the net storage cost is, defined as the difference between the
total storage cost and the convenience yield, is a function of inventories and spot price
volatility.
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Carry Models. However, these two models have a better spot price monthly return
forecast performance than the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis Model, which in turn
has better conditional and unconditional forecast performance than the Random Walk
model. Unlike the predictive ability test for 3 and 15 months ahead forecasts, we find
that, for 27 months ahead forecasts, neither the Financial Cost of Carry nor Storage
Cost models outperform the Speculative Efficiency model, however the Speculative
Efficiency model has better conditional and unconditional forecasting performance
than the Random Walk model.
Given the versatility of Giacomini and White (2006) conditional and uncondi-
tional tests to compare not only predictive ability between models but also forecasting
methodologies, as an additional contribution to the forecasting evaluation literature,
we find that both conditional and unconditional forecasting performance by iterating
autoregressive models (this forecasting methodology is called iterated multistep fore-
cast) is better than using horizon-specific estimated models (this forecasting method-
ology is called direct multistep forecast). Unlike Stock et al. (2006), we make a
univariate forecast evaluation for the aluminum spot price and we use the asymp-
totic predictive ability tests provided by Giacomini and White (2006) that converge
in distribution to conventional probability functions rather than using complicated
bootstraps procedures as those provided by Stock et al. (2006).
This paper is organized as follows. Next, I present a more detailed description
of the models to estimate. Then, I describe the data and forecasting evaluation
methodology, and report the results. Next, I present the performance evaluation
between iterated and direct multistep forecasts. Finally, I provide some conclusions.
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B. Forecasting Models
In this section, we describe in more detail the six models, mentioned above, to forecast
the aluminum spot price. Some of them are estimated in this paper
1. Random Walk Model
As we mentioned in the introduction, the Random Walk model is the benchmark
model in most of the forecasting evaluation literature. The Random walk model is an
implication of assuming that the efficient markets hypothesis does hold. The efficient
market hypothesis asserts that if markets are efficient, then there does not exist any
arbitrages opportunities. Therefore, a particular stock’s future return, in an efficient
market, will be equal to zero. See Fama (1970) and Samuelson (1965).
Therefore, under the efficient markets hypothesis, we assume that aluminum spot
prices are represented by the following expression:
St+h = St + et+h (4.1)
where St+h denotes the aluminum spot price h periods ahead, et+h denotes a zero
mean i.i.d random variable.
2. Speculative Efficiency Model
This model is also broadly used in the commodity forecasting evaluation literature
because many authors have found, for many commodities, that a particular commod-
ity future price is an unbiased predictor of its respective future spot price, see Bilson
(1981), Alquist and Kilian (2010), Otto (2011) and so on. Therefore, this model can
be represented by the following equation:
71
St+h = Ft+h,t + et+h (4.2)
where Ft+h,t denotes the aluminum future price with maturity in t + h periods and
quoted at period t, et+h denotes a zero mean iid random variable.
3. Financial Cost of Carry Model
The future-spot price parity states that any investment strategy in a particular asset
or commodity should give to the investor the same return. For example, consider the
following strategy: suppose that buying a particular commodity costs St at period
t, hence the investor invests an amount of money equal to St, and invest it in a safe
asset that provide him a risk free interest rate equal to rt. At the same time he opens
a long position in this commodity’s future contract within which he promises to buy
the commodity at a price equal to Ft+h,t with the gross return of investing in the safe
asset. Next, at period t + h he expects to receive St+h as a revenue for selling this
commodity at period t + h. Therefore, this investor expects to obtain the following
holding period return, R1t+h,t.
R1t+h,t =
St+h − Ft+h + (1 + rt)St − St
St
(4.3)
Now, consider another investment strategy, suppose that the same investor buys, at
period t, the same commodity at St, then he expects to sell this commodity at price
St+h at period t + h. In addition, he has to face a constant net storage cost c for
holding this commodity for h periods.33 Therefore, he expects the following holding
33If c is negative, it can be interpreted as net constant convenience yield otherwise
it can be interpreted as net storage cost.
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period return, R2t+h,t.
R2t+h,t =
St+h − St
St
− c (4.4)
by subtracting (4.4) from (4.3), we have:
R2t+h,t −R1t+h,t =
Ft+h,t − St
St
− c− rt (4.5)
If the future-spot price parity holds, R2t+h,t −R1t+h,t will be equal to zero. Then,
through substituting (4.5) left-hand side by zero, we have the well-known future-spot
price parity theorem or cost of carry relationship:
St =
Ft+h,t
1− c− rt (4.6)
Since we have assumed, in this section a constant storage cost but variable risk free
interest rate along time, as Damodaran (2011) did, we rename 4.6 as the financial
cost of carry relationship.
In applied financial econometrics literature, many authors, see Brenner and Kro-
ner (1995), Otto (2011), Fama and French (1987) and so on, parameterize theoretical
results as the described above to test them statistically. Unlike these authors, instead
of testing whether (4.6) does hold or not, we want to evaluate whether aluminum
futures prices and risk-free interest rate have a better forecasting performance for the
aluminum spot price than the Random Walk and the Speculative Efficiency models.
Since St, Ft+h,t and rt are non stationary stochastic processes, the parameterized
version of (4.6) in differences can be represented by the following expression:
∆st = β0 + β1∆ft+h,t + β2∆rt + et (4.7)
73
where st, ft+h,t denote the natural logarithms of St and Ft+h,t respectively and et+h
denotes a zero mean i.i.d random process.
As long as we are going to forecast h > 1 periods ahead, we need to know also the
processes that govern, ft+h,t and rt. Thus, a parsimonious way to represent these three
stochastic processes dynamics is through the following reduced-form VAR model:
∆Xt = γ0 +
K∑
k=1
γk∆Xt−k + Vt (4.8)
where Xt = {st, ft+h,t, rt}
′
, γ0, γk are 3x1 vectors of parameters, and Vt is a 3x1 errors
vector.
Inasmuch as the above VAR model only captures the short-run relationship
among these three variables, we made a cointegration test among aluminum 3-months
futures price, spot price and Treasury-bills-90-days interest rate for three different pe-
riods (1/1989 to 2/1999, 1/1995 to 2/2005 and 6/2000 to 7/2010 ).34
From this cointegration test, we found that there is at least one cointegration
vector among these three variables for each one of these periods. See Appendix for
more details.35
As long as we found a long run relationship among these three variables, at least
for the 3-months futures prices and 15-months futures prices, we propose the following
VECM as a candidate model to forecast the aluminum spot price.
That is:
34We made the same cointegration tests among 15-months futures price, spot price
and 1 year treasury bonds interest rate, and 27-months futures price, spot price and
2 year treasury bonds interest rate.
35Unlike the cointegration tests for 3 and 15-months futures contracts’ prices, for
the 27-months futures, there is not any cointegration vector among 27-months futures
price, spot price and 2 year treasury bonds interest rate.
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∆Xt = γ0 +
K∑
k=1
γk∆Xt−k + ηXt−1 + Vt (4.9)
4. Storage Cost Theory Model
Unlike the latest model, we assume in this subsection that c is changing over time
(let’s from now to change its notation by ct). Since this variable is unobservable,
authors such as Brennan (1958), Working (1949) and Pindyck (2001) assert that ct is
a function of inventories and spot price volatility. Besides, Heaney (2002) have found
that including aluminum inventories and spot price volatility in a VECM model alike
(4.9), improves the aluminum future spot price predictions by producing lower means
squared errors than models that do not have included these two additional variables.
Then, by using the same logic as in the previous subsection, we represent the
relationship among aluminum futures contract’s price, spot price, inventories, spot
price volatility and risk free interest rate through the following VAR model:
∆Xt = γ0 +
K∑
k=1
γk∆Xt−k + Vt (4.10)
where Xt =
{
st, ft+h,t, rt, zt,
∫ t
0
σsds
}′
, zt is the logarithm of aluminum inventories,
σt is the spot price conditional volatility, γ0 and γk are 5x1 vectors of parameters.
Inasmuch as the above VAR model only captures the short-run relationship
among these five variables, we made a cointegration test among aluminum 3-months
futures contracts’ price, spot price, inventories, spot price volatility and treasury bills
90 days interest rate for three different periods (1/1989 to 2/1999, 1/1995 to 2/2005
and 6/2000 to 7/2010 ).36
36We made the same cointegration tests among aluminum 15-months futures price,
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From this cointegration test, we found that there is at least one cointegration
vector among these five variables for each one of these periods. See Appendix for
more details.
As long as we found a long run relationship among these five variables, at least
for the 3-months, 15-months and 27-months futures prices, we propose the following
VECM as a candidate model to forecast the aluminum spot price.
∆Xt = γ0 +
K∑
k=1
γk∆Xt−k + ηXt−1 + Vt (4.11)
where Xt = {st, ft+h,t, rt, zt, σt}
′
, zt is the logarithm of aluminum inventories, σt is
the spot price conditional volatility, γ0 and γk are 5x1 vectors of parameters.
C. Predictive Ability Tests between Models
1. Data
Spot price, 3, 15 and 27 months official futures contracts’ prices and inventories for
aluminum, used for the above models estimation and prediction, were obtained from
the London Metal Exchange (LME). The sample period, used in this paper, goes from
January of 1989 to October 2010. Since 15 months and 27 months futures contracts’
delivery dates are not daily (in fact, their delivery dates are on each month’s third
Wednesday), we decided to use monthly frequency data. Every monthly observation
represents an average of the daily close prices and inventories traded at the LME. 37
spot price, inventories, spot price volatility and 1 year treasury bonds interest rate,
and among aluminum 27-months futures price, spot price, inventories, spot price
volatility and 2 year treasury bonds interest rate.
37If an investor opened a long position in aluminum 3-months futures contract on
3/31/2011, the LME associated warehouse has to deliver the aluminum’s quantity,
specified in the contract, by 6/30/2011 or this investor has to close his position on
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For the risk free interest rates, we use the 90-days USA Treasury bills, the 1-year
USA Treasury bonds and the 2-years USA Treasury bonds nominal interest rates from
the period January of 1989 to October 2010, this interest rate data was taken from
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) webpage. Alike the Aluminum futures prices, we use
monthly frequency for the risk free interest rates data instead of daily or weekly data.38
Finally, the aluminum spot price volatility is calculated as the monthly average of
the daily standard deviation of the aluminum official spot prices return of the last 20
days, ending at day t.39
2. Methodology
Since we are going to use the Giacomini and White (2006) conditional and uncondi-
tional predictive ability tests to evaluate the above models forecasting performance,
we need to use the ”rolling window” estimation method to avoid that estimation un-
certainty vanishes asymptotically, see Giacomini and White (2006) for more details
about the importance of using this estimation method.40
6/28/2011. However, if the same investor opened a long position in aluminum 15-
months futures contract on 3/31/2011, the LME associated warehouse has to deliver
on 6/20/2011, which is the third Wednesday of June 2012, or this investor has to
close his position on 6/28/2012. In the same way, if this investor opened a long
position in aluminum 27-months futures contract on 3/31/2011, the LME associated
warehouse has to deliver on 6/20/2013, which is the third Wednesday of June 2013,
or this investor has to close his position on 6/28/2013.
38Treasury bills and bonds interest rates monthly data are calculated by the FRB
as the simple average of their respective weekly rates.
39According to LME, the officials prices are, verified by the Quotations Committee,
based on the last bids and offers at the close of the second trading session for each
metal.
40The following steps, describe the rolling window estimation method. First, to
estimate a model and to forecast the variable of interest until the desired horizon by
using the first m observations as information set. Second, to estimate and to forecast
again the same model with the same number of observations m but dropping the first
observation and adding the (m+1)th observation. Then repeat the second step but
dropping second observation and adding the (m+2)th observation to the second step
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We set the rolling window length to 120 months, so we have an out-of-sample
forecast evaluation period of 139 months, 127 months, and 113 months if our desired
forecast horizon is 3 ,15 and 27 months ahead respectively. For example, if we want
to evaluate the forecasting performance for a particular model three months ahead,
we need first to estimate it, from 1989:1 until 1999:1, and then forecast the aluminum
spot price three months ahead. This implies that our out-of-forecast sample will start
on 1999:4. As long as we are using the rolling window estimation method, we estimate
the same model from 1989:2 until 1999:2 and, then forecast it three months ahead.
This implies that our second out-of-sample forecast observation will be on 2000:1.
Then, we continue with the same procedure until obtaining our last out-of-sample
forecast observation, which is on 2010:10.
The use of the rolling window estimation method raises the following questions,
first how many lags should the VAR and the VECM include as long as the information
criteria that we use to set the number of lags might change as we change the window
estimation sample set? Second, how many cointegration vectors should we include in
VECM as long as the number of cointegrating vectors might change when we change
the window estimation sample set?
In this paper, we solve the first question by programming a simple algorithm that
chooses the optimal number of lags for each VAR and VECM at each different m size
rolling window through using any of the standard lag information criteria; in this
paper, we use the Schwartz information criterion. However, dealing with the second
question can be computationally burdensome because in our forecast evaluation we
need to use at least 112 m size rolling windows.
Once we have our respective out-of-sample forecast, we compute their forecasting
sample and so on so forth.
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error and hence its respective loss functions. Here, we use the usual squared error
loss function,
Lt+h(Yt+h,M
j
t+h,t) =
(
Yt+h −M jt+h,t
)2
for every h > 0 (4.12)
where Yt+h denotes the observed variable of interest at period t+h and M
j
t+h,t denotes
the variable of interest h-periods-ahead forecast, which is produced by the estimated
j-th model with information observed until period t.
Inasmuch as we want to test statistically which model has a better forecasting
performance, Giacomini and White (2006) propose the following hypothesis testing:
For a given loss function L and σ-field, Gt, the null hypothesis of equal conditional
predictive ability of M jt+h,t and M
l
t+h,t for a desired horizon t+ h is represented by,
H0 : E
[
Lt+h(Yt+h,M
j
t+h,t)− Lt+h(Yt+h,M lt+h,t)|Gt,
]
= 0 a.s t=1,2, . . . (4.13)
Depending on the σ-field’s elements, Giacomini and White (2006) proposes the
following two kinds of predictive ability tests: the conditional and the unconditional
predictive ability test.
a. Conditional Predictive Ability Test
In the conditional predictive test, it is assumed that the σ-field Gt = Ft, where,
Ft = σ
(
W
′
1, ....,W
′
t , X
′
t+1
)′
, Wt ≡
(
Yt, X
′
t
)
, Yt is the variable of interest and Xt is
a vector of predictor variables. To carry out this test, Giacomini and White (2006)
show that testing (4.13) is equivalent to test the following equation when Gt = Ft.
H0,d : E [dt∆Lm,t+h] = 0 a.s for all t ≥ 1 (4.14)
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where ∆Lm,t+h = Lt+h(Yt+h,M
j
t+h,t) − Lt+h(Yt+h,M lt+h,t), dt is a qx1 Ft-measurable
vector or also known as test function.
Then, to test (4.14), Giacomini and White (2006) proposed the following statistic
tests:
for h = 1
T dm,n = nZ¯
′
m,tΩˆ
−1
n Z¯m,t
d→ χ2q (4.15)
where,
Z¯m,t+1 =
(
n−1
T−1∑
t=m
Zm,t+1
)
(4.16)
Zm,t+1 = dt∆Lm,t+1 (4.17)
Ωˆn ≡ n−1
T−1∑
t=m
Zm,t+1Z
′
m,t+1 (4.18)
for h > 1
T dm,n,h = nZ¯
′
m,t,hΩ˜
−1
n Z¯m,t,h
d→ χ2q (4.19)
where,
Z¯m,t+h =
(
n−1
T−h∑
t=m
Zm,t+h
)
(4.20)
Zm,t+h = dt∆Lm,t+h (4.21)
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Ω˜n ≡ n−1
T−h∑
t=m
Zm,t+hZ
′
m,t+h + n
−1
h−1∑
s=1
wn,s
T−h∑
t=m
[
Zm,t+hZ
′
m,t+h−s + Zm,t+h−sZ
′
m,t+h
]
(4.22)
Ω˜n is, in simple words, the Newey and West (1987) estimator of Ωn and wn,s is a
weight function, which are defined in detail by Giacomini and White (2006).
If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, that is when T dm,n,h ≤ χ2q(α) , Giacomini
and White (2006) advise to use the most parsimonious model.41
However, if we reject H0, that is when T
d
m,n,h > χ
2
q(α), we cannot use the mean
squared error to rank the models conditional predictive ability because this test is
conditional to the information observed until period t. In that case, they suggested
carrying out the following decision rule for forecasting performance ranking:
1. Regress ∆Lm,t+h on dt over the out-of-sample period t = m+1, . . ., T −h and
let δˆn denotes the regression coefficient.
2. Compute the following indicator function: In,c = n
−1∑T−h
t=m 1
{
δˆ
′
n > c
}
, where
1
{
δˆ
′
n > c
}
equals 1 if δˆ
′
n > c and 0 otherwise. Where c is user-specified threshold,
Giacomini and White (2006) set c equal to zero.
3. If 1
{
δˆ
′
n > c
}
= 1, model M l, has a better forecasting performance than M j
at period t+ h.
4. Since Im,n denotes the proportion of times that model M
l performs better
than M j, then if Im,n > 0.5, we choose model M
l.
41α denotes the test’s significance level.
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b. Unconditional Predictive Ability Test
Unlike the conditional predictive test, in the unconditional predictive ability test is
assumed that the σ-field Gt = {φ,Ω}. For h ≥ 1, Giacomini and White (2006) propose
the following test statistic, which coincide with that proposed by Diebold and Mariano
(1995) test except that the ∆Lm,n assumed by Giacomini and White (2006) is different
and more general than that assumed by Diebold and Mariano (1995), because the
former avoid that models estimation uncertainty vanish asymptotically.
tm,n,h =
∆L¯m,n
σˆn/
√
n
d→ N(0, 1) (4.23)
where σˆ2n is a HAC estimator of the asymptotic variance σ
2
n = var
[√
n∆L¯m,n
]
.
If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, that is when T dm,n,h ≤ z(α)/2 , Giacomini
and White (2006) proposes to use the most parsimonious model. However, if we
reject H0, that is when T
d
m,n,h > Z(α)/2, we choose the model that has the lowest
mean squared error as long as this is a unconditional test.
3. Results
Tables XVI, XVII and XVIII summarize the conditional and unconditional 3, 15 and
27 months-ahead predictive ability tests between the models described in section 2.
The first column reports the pairs of models to compare. Where (1) denotes the
Random Walk model, (2) represents the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis model, (3)
denotes the VAR version of the Financial Cost of Carry model, (4) represents the
VECM version of the Financial Cost of Carry Model, (5) denotes the VAR version
of the Storage Cost model and (6) represents the VECM version of the Storage Cost
model. The second column reports the conditional predictive ability test values for
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each pair of models’ comparison whereas the third column presents their respective
p-values.42
The fourth column reports the indicator function In,c, which notes the propor-
tion of times that the rightmost model, reported in the first column, outperforms the
leftmost model, reported also in the first column. The fifth column reports either
a number or a character, N . The former indicates which one of the two compar-
ing models has the best aluminum spot price’s conditional forecasting performance
whereas the later indicates that both models have the same aluminum spot price’s
conditional forecasting performance.
The fifth column’s value is determined, first, by contrasting if the p-value, re-
ported in the third column, is either lower or higher than the 10% significance level. If
this p-value is lower than 10%, we fail to reject (4.14) and, therefore, we conclude that
both models have the same conditional forecasting performance. Nevertheless, If this
p-value is higher than 10%, we reject (4.14), and, therefore, we conclude that both
models have a different conditional forecasting performance. In order to determine
which one of those two comparing models has the best conditional future spot price’s
forecasting performance, we use the model selection rule described in the fourth step
of the last subsection.
42The test values, reported in the second column, are obtained by evaluating
∆Lm,t+h and dt, obtained by comparing two particular models’ out-of-sample spot
price forecast, in equation (4.19). The p-values, reported in the third column, are
obtained by evaluating the test values, reported in the second column, in a standard
χ-square distribution function.
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From this model selection rule’s value, which is reported in the fourth column, we con-
clude that the leftmost model, reported in the first column, have a better conditional
future spot price’s forecasting performance if In,c is less than 0.5.
The sixth column reports the unconditional predictive ability test values for each
pair of models comparison whereas the seventh column presents their respective p-
values.43
The eighth column reports either a number or a character, N . The former
indicates which one of the two comparing models has a better spot price forecasting
performance for any period whereas the later indicates that both models have the
same unconditional forecasting performance.44
All the above model estimations, forecasts and predictive ability tests are pro-
grammed in Eviews 5.0 and their codes are available upon request. These predictive
ability tests provided in my code produce the same results as those provided by
Giacomini’s webpage.
43The test values, reported in the sixth column, result from evaluating ∆Lm,t+h,
previously obtained by comparing two particular models out-of-sample spot price fore-
cast, in equation (4.23). The p-values, reported in the seventh column, results from
evaluating the test values, reported in the sixth column, in a t-student distribution
function.
44The seventh column’s value is determined, first, by contrasting if the p-value,
reported in the seventh column, is lower or higher than the 10% significance level. If
this p-value is lower than 10%, we fail to reject (4.14) and, therefore, we conclude that
both models have the same unconditional forecasting performance. Nevertheless, If
this p-value is higher than 10%, we reject (4.14), and, therefore, we conclude that both
models have a different unconditional forecasting performance. In order to determine
which one of those two comparing models have a better unconditional future spot
price forecasting performance, we choose the model having the lowest mean squared
error.
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Table XVI.
Forecasting Performance Evaluation Test: Three-months-ahead
Conditional Unconditional
Models Test-Value P-value In,c Winner Test-Value P-value Winner
(2) vs (1) 15.4859 0.0004 0.0074 (2) -3.8227 0.0002 (2)
(3) vs (1) 12.4138 0.0020 0.1471 (3) -3.4618 0.0007 (3)
(4) vs (1) 13.0279 0.0015 0.1397 (4) -3.3556 0.0010 (4)
(5) vs (1) 12.5639 0.0019 0.1397 (5) -3.4491 0.0007 (5)
(6) vs (1) 12.1586 0.0023 0.1397 (6) -3.603 0.0004 (6)
(3) vs (2) 10.7410 0.0047 0.1618 (3) -3.1410 0.0021 (3)
(4) vs (2) 11.3094 0.0035 0.1544 (4) -3.0424 0.0028 (4)
(5) vs (2) 10.9097 0.0043 0.1618 (5) -3.1266 0.0022 (5)
(6) vs (2) 10.4881 0.0053 0.1618 (6) -3.2868 0.0013 (6)
(3) vs (5) 5.0912 0.0784 0.0221 (3) -1.3908 0.1665 N
(4) vs (6) 5.8351 0.0541 0.8971 (6) 0.1680 0.8668 N
(3) vs (6) 4.0006 0.1353 NA N 0.1838 0.8544 N
From Table XVI we conclude, first, that the Speculative Efficiency Hypothe-
sis model (i.e. model 2) has a better both conditional and unconditional three-
months-ahead forecasting performance than the Random Walk model (i.e. model 1).
Therefore, the aluminum 3-months futures contracts’ prices are useful to predict the
aluminum spot price monthly return three months ahead.
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Second, we can see that both the Financial Cost of Carry and the Storage Cost
Theory models have the best both conditional and unconditional three-months-ahead
forecasting performance than both the Random Walk model and the Speculative
Efficiency Hypothesis model. Therefore, we bring to a close that even though the
3-months futures contracts’ prices are helpful to predict the aluminum spot price
monthly return three months ahead, variables such as the 90 days-Treasury-bills
nominal interest rate, aluminum inventories and aluminum spot price volatility com-
plement the aluminum 3-months futures contracts’ prices in forecasting its spot price
three months ahead.
Third, we can see that if we use the VAR approach for both the Financial Cost
of Carry model and the Storage Cost model, we find that the former has a better
forecasting performance than the later. In contrast, if we use the VECM approach
for these two models, the result is the opposite.
Fourth, since from the VAR approach for the Financial Cost of Carry model has
the best aluminum spot price’s forecasting performance and since from the VECM ap-
proach for the Storage Cost model has the best aluminum spot price monthly return’s
forecasting performance model, we test the conditional and the unconditional predic-
tive ability between these two models. From this test, we conclude that these two
models have the same aluminum spot price monthly return forecasting performance.
Therefore, as Giacomini and White (2006) suggest, we choose the VAR approach for
the Financial Cost of Carry model has the best three-months-ahead forecasting per-
formance for the aluminum spot price monthly return because the VAR approach is
more parsimonious than the VECM approach.
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Table XVII.
Forecasting Performance Evaluation Test: Fifteen-months-ahead
Conditional Unconditional
Models Test-Value P-value In,c Winner Test-Value P-value Winner
(2) vs (1) 42.7457 0.0000 0.0446 (2) -2.4459 0.0158 (2)
(3) vs (1) 5.8728 0.0531 0.1607 (3) -2.2813 0.0242 (3)
(4) vs (1) 5.5226 0.0632 0.1607 (4) -2.2557 0.0258 (4)
(5) vs (1) 5.8744 0.0530 0.1607 (5) -2.2835 0.0241 (5)
(6) vs (1) 6.0900 0.0476 0.1607 (6) -2.2993 0.0231 (6)
(3) vs (2) 4.3079 0.1160 NA N -1.8748 0.0631 (3)
(4) vs (2) 3.9631 0.1379 NA N -1.8506 0.0666 (4)
(5) vs (2) 4.3076 0.1160 NA N -1.8762 0.0629 (5)
(6) vs (2) 4.5207 0.1043 NA N -1.8905 0.0610 (6)
(3) vs (5) 2.1463 0.3419 NA N -1.2368 0.2185 N
(4) vs (6) 3.0691 0.2156 NA N 0.8144 0.4170 N
From Table XVII we conclude, first, that the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis
model has a better both conditional and unconditional fifteen-months-ahead forecast-
ing performance for the aluminum spot price monthly return than the Random Walk
model. Therefore, the aluminum 15-months futures contracts’ prices are useful to
predict the aluminum spot price monthly return fifteen months ahead.
Second, we can see that both the Financial Cost of Carry and the Storage Cost
87
Theory models have a better conditional and unconditional fifteen-months-ahead fore-
casting performance for the aluminum spot price than the Random Walk model.
In contrast, they have the same fifteen-months-ahead conditional forecasting per-
formance as the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis model. However, the Financial
Cost of Carry and the Storage Cost Theory models have a better fifteen-months-ahead
unconditional forecasting performance than the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis
model. From this result, it is difficult to provide a conclusion because it is expected
that if both models had the same conditional forecasting performance for all periods,
they will have the same unconditional forecasting performance. [ i.e equation (4.14)
with Gt = Ft implies equation (4.14) with Gt = {Ωt, φt}] However, these outcomes are
not reflecting this implication. Thus, according to Giacomini and White (2006) this
outcome happens because either the conditional forecasting performance test has a
lower power or the unconditional test is oversized.
Therefore, we bring to a close that variables such as the 1-year-Treasury-bonds
nominal interest rate, aluminum inventories and aluminum spot price volatility may
or not complement the aluminum 15-months futures contracts’ price to forecast the
aluminum spot price monthly return fifteen months ahead.
Third, if we use either the VAR or the VECM approach for both the Financial
Cost of Carry model and the Storage Cost model, we find that both models have the
same both conditional and unconditional forecasting performance for the aluminum
spot price monthly return.
From these three above results, we can conclude that if the conditional predictive
ability test has a lower power, the 15-months aluminum futures contracts’ prices will
be the best predictor for the aluminum spot prices fifteen months ahead. However,
if the unconditional predictive ability test is oversized either the Financial Cost of
Carry model or the storage Cost model will be the best predictor for the aluminum
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spot price fifteen months ahead.
Table XVIII.
Forecasting Performance Evaluation: Twenty-Seven-months-ahead
Conditional Unconditional
Models Test-Value P-value In,c Winner Test-Value P-value Winner
(2) vs (1) 7.9726 0.0186 0.1477 (2) -3.3493 0.0011 (2)
(3) vs (1) 4.9968 0.0822 0.2386 (3) -2.8492 0.0052 (3)
(4) vs (1) 3.4630 0.1770 NA N -2.1018 0.0378 (4)
(5) vs (1) 4.9966 0.0822 0.2386 (5) -2.848 0.0052 (5)
(6) vs (1) 5.0066 0.0818 0.2386 (6) -2.8488 0.0052 (6)
(3) vs (2) 4.3226 0.1152 NA N -1.0723 0.2859 N
(4) vs (2) 3.8955 0.1426 NA N -0.1657 0.8687 N
(5) vs (2) 4.3201 0.1153 NA N -1.0701 0.2868 N
(6) vs (2) 4.3125 0.1158 NA N -1.0677 0.2879 N
(3) vs (5) 5.4511 0.0655 0.1477 (3) -1.0588 0.2919 N
(4) vs (6) 2.1231 0.3459 NA N 1.0259 0.3071 N
From Table XVIII we conclude, first, that the Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis
model has a better both conditional and unconditional twenty-seven-months-ahead
forecast performance than the Random Walk model.
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Therefore, the aluminum 27-months futures contracts’ prices are useful to predict
the aluminum spot price monthly return twenty-seven months ahead.
Second, unlike the three and fifteen months-ahead predictive ability tests, we
can see that both the Financial Cost of Carry and the Storage Cost Theory models
have the same conditional twenty-seven-months-ahead forecasting performance as the
Speculative Efficiency model.
Therefore, we bring to a close that variables such as the 2-years-Treasury-bonds
nominal interest rate, aluminum inventories and aluminum spot price volatility do
not complement the aluminum 27-months futures price in forecasting the spot price
monthly return twenty-seven months ahead.
Fourth, the VAR approach for the Financial Cost of Carry model has a better
conditional forecasting performance than its respective VECM approach. However,
the VAR approach for the Storage Cost Theory model has the same unconditional
forecasting performance as its respective VECM.
D. Predictive Ability Tests between Iterated and Direct Multistep Forecasting Meth-
ods
As we reported in the last section, all of our forecast performance evaluations are
based on multiperiod forecasts and our estimated models are autoregressive. In the
forecasting literature, see Stock et al. (2006), there are two methods to produce
multiperiod forecasts with autoregressive models. The first one is through estimating
the model to forecast and then iterating upon that model to obtain its multiperiod
forecast. The second one is through regressing model’s dependent variables h-periods-
hence against a constant and both present and past values of both dependents and
independents variables.
90
In this section, we are going to apply the Giacomini and White (2006)’s condi-
tional and unconditional predictive ability tests to see which one of these two fore-
casting methods has the best conditional and unconditional predictive ability for the
aluminum spot price monthly return three, fifteen, and twenty-seven months ahead.
Unlike Stock et al. (2006), we use, here, asymptotic forecasting performance tests
rather than using complicated bootstrapping procedures which are computationally
expensive, hardly precise and often hard to replicate, see Brooks (2008).
1. Methodology
To implement the Giacomini and White (2006) predictive ability tests, we need, first,
to compute the forecasting error loss function, Lt+h(Xt+h,
ˆXjt+h) for each multiperiod
forecasting method.
a. Iterated Multiperiod Forecasting Method
Consider an estimated version of (4.8), represented by the following expression:
∆Xt = γˆ0 +
K∑
k=1
γˆk∆Xt−k + Vt (4.24)
Iterate (4.24) h− k times to obtain ∆Xˆt+h then, compute Lt+h(∆Xt+h,∆ ˆX it+h).
b. Direct Multiperiod Forecasting Method
Instead of estimating (4.8) and iterating upon it, direct forecasting method requires
estimating the following VAR model:
∆Xt = γ0 +
K∑
k=0
γk∆Xt−k−h +Wt for h > 1 (4.25)
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where Wt is a vector of errors, which have the same number of rows as ∆Xt After
estimating, (4.25), compute ∆Xˆt+h and, then, Lt+h(∆Xt+h,∆Xˆ
d
t+h) which have the
same sample size as Lt+h(∆Xt+h,∆Xˆ
i
t+h).
c. Conditional and Unconditional Predictive Ability Tests
Once Lt+h(∆Xt+h,∆Xˆ
d
t+h) and Lt+h(∆Xt+h,∆Xˆ
i
t+h) have been obtained, we need
to substitute them into (4.19) to reject or not the null hypothesis of equal fore-
casting performance between the two methodologies. Here, we also assume dt =[
1,∆Lt+h(∆Xt+h,∆Xˆ
j
t+h)
]
and σ-field Gt = Ft for the conditional predictive ability
test and σ-field Gt = {φ,Ω} for the unconditional predictive ability test.
In this paper, we do not make any direct multistep forecast by using VECM
models [e.g. models (4) and (6)] because if we want to make direct multistep forecasts,
the VECM represented by (4.9) will turn into the following heterodox VECM:
∆Xt = γ0 +
K∑
k=0
γk∆Xt−k−h + ηXt−1−h (4.26)
Estimating this heterodox VECM is out of this paper’s scope and will be an interesting
as a future work research related to develop direct multistep forecasting methods for
VECM models.
2. Results
Tables XIX, XX and XXI summarize the conditional and unconditional 3, 15 and
27 months-ahead predictive ability tests, for the aluminum spot price, between these
two multistep forecasting methodologies. The first column reports the two multi-
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period forecasting methodologies to compare, direct, D, and iterated, I. The second
column reports the model that we use for this exercise. The third column reports
the conditional predictive ability test values whereas the fourth column presents their
respective p-values.
The fifth column reports the function In,c, which indicates the proportion of times
that the direct forecasting method outperforms the iterated multistep forecasting
method. The sixth column reports either a number or a character, N . The former
indicates which one of the two comparing forecasting methodologies has the best
conditional forecasting performance whereas the later indicates that both forecasting
methodologies have the same conditional forecasting performance.
The seventh column reports the unconditional predictive ability test values whereas
the eighth column presents their respective p-values. The ninth column reports either
a number or a character, N . The former indicates which one of the two comparing
forecasting methodologies has the best spot price forecasting performance for any
period whereas the later indicates that both forecasting methodologies have the same
unconditional forecasting performance.
93
Table XIX.
Multistep Forecasting Performance Evaluation - Direct vs Iterated: Three-months-
ahead
Conditional Unconditional
Methods Model Test P-value In,c Winner Test P-value Winner
(D) vs (I) (3) 12.1388 0.0023 0.8897 (I) 1.5198 0.1309 N
(D) vs (I) (5) 10.8744 0.0044 0.9485 (I) 1.3665 0.1740 N
Table XX.
Multistep Forecasting Performance Evaluation - Direct vs. Iterated: Fifteen-months-
ahead
Conditional Unconditional
Methods Model Test P-value In,c Winner Test P-value Winner
(D) vs (I) (3) 8.9531 0.0114 0.9286 (I) 1.1455 0.2542 N
(D) vs (I) (5) 5.0684 0.0793 0.8661 (I) 1.4765 0.1423 N
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Table XXI.
Multistep Forecasting Performance Evaluation - Direct vs Iterated: Twenty-seven-
months-ahead
Conditional Unconditional
Methods Model Test P-value In,c Winner Test P-value Winner
(D) vs (I) (3) 3.6349 0.1624 NA N 0.7048 0.4829 N
(D) vs (I) (5) 3.4536 0.1779 NA N 0.8287 0.4096 N
From Tables XIX, XX and XXI I conclude, first, that for both Financial Cost of
Carry and Storage Cost Theory models, iterated multistep forecasting methodology
has a better conditional predictive ability than the direct forecasting methodology for
aluminum spot price monthly return three and fifteen months ahead. However, this
is not true for the aluminum spot price monthly return forecast twenty-seven months
ahead.
On the other hand, these two forecasting methodologies have the same uncon-
ditional predictive ability for aluminum spot price three, fifteen and twenty-seven
months ahead.
Therefore, we conclude that the iterated multistep forecasting methodology is
more efficient than the direct multistep forecasting methodology if we want to forecast,
by using whichever of VAR models presented in this paper, the aluminum spot price
monthly return for a specified period, in this paper those specified periods are three
and fifteen months ahead.
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E. Conclusion
We have explored the ability of futures contracts’ prices, inventories, risk-free-assets
interest rate and spot price volatility to predict the spot price monthly return three,
fifteen and twenty seven months ahead for the aluminum traded at the London Metal
Exchange (LME). By applying the conditional and unconditional predictive ability
tests developed by Giacomini and White (2006) and using the Speculative Efficiency
model we have found that aluminum 3, 15, 27 futures contracts’ prices have a better
forecasting performance for the aluminum spot price three, fifteen and twenty-seven
months ahead than a No-drift Random Walk.
In addition, we have found that risk-free-asset interest rates, aluminum inven-
tories and spot price volatility complement the aluminum futures contracts’ prices
performance in forecasting the aluminum spot price three and fifteen months ahead.
In particular, we have found that a VAR version of the Financial Cost of Carry model
is has the best forecasting performance for the aluminum spot price monthly return
three and fifteen months ahead among the models presented in this paper.
A new application of the Giacomini and White (2006), conditional and uncon-
ditional predictive ability tests, applied in this paper, is the forecasting performance
comparison between the iterated multistep and the directed multistep forecasting
methods, broadly discussed by Stock et al. (2006), for autoregressive models. From
this application, we have found that the iterated multistep forecasting method of
VAR models, used for aluminum spot price prediction, produces better three and fif-
teen months-ahead forecasts for the aluminum spot price monthly return than those
produced by the direct multistep forecasting method. This result is robust as long as
we used a long sample size and an asymptotic forecasting performance tests instead
of using complicated and, sometimes, non- accurate, bootstrapping methods.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In Chapter II, I have presented a very simple two-country new-Keynesian model in
which the inclusion of imperfect substitution between home and foreign consumption,
home bias consumption, inflation’s inertia and the existence of productivity shocks
as well as monetary shocks are key for solving the Wang and Wen (2007)’s puzzle of
the joint occurrence of positive cross-country correlation in inflation and a near-zero
cross-country correlation in money growth.
Although this model adequately captures the signs and magnitude of the cross
country-correlations in inflation, output, and consumption, this model tends to gen-
erate a stronger positive cross country correlation in output than inflation. Future
work is needed to investigate whether this model can generate a stronger positive
cross country correlation in inflation than in output.
In Chapter III, I have found, first, that gains from international monetary co-
operation between two countries are different from zero when the elasticity of sub-
stitution between domestic and foreign goods consumption (Armington elasticity of
substitution) is different from one.
Second, I have found also that when the Armington elasticity of substitution is
less than one, this model predicts a unique Nash equilibrium, in which all exporting
firms in both countries choose to price in their own currency and the central bank’s
optimal monetary policy implies a flexible exchange rate. However, this model pre-
dicts multiple Nash equilibria, when the Armington elasticity of substitution is larger
and equal than one.
Third, I have also found that strategic complementarities, defined by Steinsson
(2008), is not the only sufficient condition to support the existence of asymmetric
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Nash Equilibria such as (LCP,PCP) or (PCP,LCP). Furthermore, these asymmetric
Nash equilibria can be supported under strategic substitution. (i.e. when σ+ψ < 1)
Fourth, under different sets of preferences and elasticities of substitution val-
ues, this model confirms theoretical results obtained previously in the international
macroeconomics literature, (see Devereux and Engel (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti
(2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)) such as that (PCP,PCP) Nash Equilibrium
Pareto dominates the (LCP,LCP) Nash Equilibrium.
This model can be extended for different country sizes. In particular, this requires
to deal with the risk sharing condition’s constant and to model a Nash Bargaining
solution to determine the optimal international monetary policy under coordination
as long as the different-country size assumption implies different units of welfare
measure for each country.
Finally, it is also important to incorporate segmented markets into this model
to determine endogenously which fraction of exporting firms set their prices either in
domestic or in foreign currency. This idea is motivated from Fukuda (1994) who says
that firms are indifferent to price their exports in domestic or foreign currency when
they have access to futures market.
In Chapter IV, I have explored the ability of futures contracts’ prices, invento-
ries, risk-free-assets interest rate and spot price volatility to predict the spot price
monthly return three, fifteen and twenty seven months ahead for the aluminum traded
at the London Metal Exchange (LME). By applying the conditional and unconditional
predictive ability tests developed by Giacomini and White (2006) and using the Spec-
ulative Efficiency model I have found that aluminum 3, 15, 27 futures contracts’ prices
have a better forecasting performance for the aluminum spot price monthly return
three, fifteen and twenty-seven months ahead than a No-drift Random Walk.
In addition, I have found that risk-free-asset interest rates, aluminum inven-
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tories and spot price volatility complement the aluminum futures contracts’ prices
performance in forecasting the aluminum spot price monthly return three and fifteen
months ahead. In particular, I have found that a VAR version of the Financial Cost
of Carry model is has the best forecasting performance for the aluminum spot price
monthly return three and fifteen months ahead among the models presented in this
paper.
A new application of the Giacomini and White (2006), conditional and uncon-
ditional predictive ability tests, applied in this paper, is the forecasting performance
comparison between the iterated multistep and the directed multistep forecasting
methods, broadly discussed by Stock et al. (2006), for autoregressive models. From
this application, I have found that the iterated multistep forecasting method of VAR
models, used for aluminum spot price monthly return prediction, produces better
three and fifteen months-ahead forecasts for the aluminum spot price than those pro-
duced by the direct multistep forecasting method. This result is robust as long as I
used a long sample size and an asymptotic forecasting performance tests instead of
using complicated and, sometimes, non- accurate, bootstrapping methods.
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APPENDIX
A. Description of Data
This appendix describes the data source and range. From the (IFS) database, I
obtained series of Consumer Price Index (CPI), Real Gross Domestic Output (GDP)
and Money Supply, (M1). All these data are available for these five countries. The
range goes from 1977 Q1 to 2008 Q1. The cross-country correlation in inflation is
computed from the quarterly percent change in the CPI. The cross-country correlation
in output is computed from the percent deviation of the GDP from its long run trend,
which is obtained through the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter.
B. Model’s Structure
Efficient Risk Sharing Condition
In this subsection, I present the derivation of the Efficient Risk Sharing Condition
implied by the households’ intertemporal maximization of this model:
by substituting (3.7) in (2.7), we get:
C−σt
Pt
Q(st+1|st)− β
[
C−σ(st+1|st)
P (st+1|st)
]
(B.1)
since these two countries are the same, then we have:
(C∗t )
−σ
P ∗t
Q∗(st+1|st)− β
[
(C∗)−σ(st+1|st)
P ∗(st+1|st)
]
(B.2)
then by dividing (B.1) by (B.2), we get:
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C−σt
(C∗t )−σ
RERt
Et
=
C−σ(st+1|st)
(C∗)−σ(st+1|st)RER(s
t+1|st)E(st+1|st) (B.3)
where: RERt ≡ EtP ∗t /Pt is the real exchange rate and Et is the nominal exchange
rate.
If we assume that initially the two economies are perfectly symmetric (i.e. in
state s they have the same prices and marginal utility), then (B.3) implies:
RERt =
(C∗)−σ(st+1|st)
C−σ(st+1|st) (B.4)
which is nothing but the Efficient Risk Sharing Condition .
Intratemporal Optimization Problem
At each period t, the representative household chooses CH,t and CF,t which minimizes
its total expenditure:
PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t (B.5)
given that they have chosen {Ct}∞t=0 previously.45
subject to:
45Since the representative household preferences are separable on every period , I
can solve this intratemporal minimization problem independently from the intertem-
poral maximization problem described previously.
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Ct = C
γ
H,tC
1−γ
F,t (B.6)
as we can see (B.6) is an implication of assuming imperfect substitution in consump-
tion between domestic and foreign goods.
where CH,t denotes the home consumption of the domestic final good, CF,t denotes the
home consumption of the foreign final good, PH,t and PF,t are their prices respectively.
F.O.C
CH,t : PH,t − νtγCγ−1H,t C1−γF,t = 0 (B.7)
CF,t : PF,t − νt(1− γ)CγH,tC−γF,t = 0 (B.8)
νt : Ct − CγH,tC1−γF,t = 0 (B.9)
where ν is the Lagrange multiplier associated to (3.2).
The main implication of this intratemporal minimization problem is:
Pt = φP
γ
H,tP
1−γ
F,t (B.10)
where φ =
[
(γ/ 1− γ)1−γ + (1− γ/ γ)γ
]
Price Setting
Following Calvo (1983) I assume that each individual firm resets its price with prob-
ability (1 − θ) each period, independently of the time elapsed since its last price
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adjustment. Thus, each period a measure (1 − θ) of (randomly selected) firms reset
their prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged.
Let PH,t(i) denotes the price set by a firm i adjusting its price in period t. Let
PH,t(i) denotes the price set by a firm i adjusting its price in period t. Under the Calvo
price setting structure, PH,t+k(i) = PH,t(i) with probability θ
k for k = 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,
... . Then, the firm’s optimal price setting model is written as follows:
PH,t(i) = argmax
∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+kEt
[
PH,t(i)−MCh,t(i)
]
(B.11)
subject to (2.13) and taking YH,t+k as given.
F.O.C
∞∑
k=0
Qt,t+kEt
[
(1− ζ) (PH,t(i)/PH,t)−ζ YH,t+k]+ ...
∞∑
k=0
Qt,t+kEt
[
ζ
(
PH,t(i)/PH,t
)−ζ−1
RMCH,t(i)YH,t+k
]
= 0 (B.12)
∞∑
k=0
Qt,t+kEt
[((
PH,t(i)/PH,t
)− (ζ/ζ − 1)RMCH,t(i))YH,t+k] = 0 (B.13)
where RMCH,t(i) = MCh, t(i)/PH,t.
Since all firms resetting prices in any given period and having identical technology
they will choose the same price, I henceforth drop the i subscript.
∞∑
k=0
Qt,t+kEt
[((
PH,t/PH,t
)− (ζ/ζ − 1)RMCH,t)YH,t+k] = 0 (B.14)
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where ζ/1− ζ denotes the intermediate firms’ mark-up.
C. Equations implied by the model
This appendix presents the system of dynamic equations implied by this model under
Flexible Prices and under Sticky Prices.
Flexible Prices
• From (3.7),(3.8) and (3.9) we have:
ψ
β
Nηt C
σ
H,t+1|t = Wt (C.1)
• Recalling (3.2) we have:
Ct = C
γ
H,tC
1−γ
F,t (C.2)
• Recalling (B.3), we have
RERt =
(C∗)−σt
C−σt
(C.3)
• From (B.12) and (B.13) we have:
CH,t/CF,t =
(
γ
1− γ
)
TOTt (C.4)
where TOTt =
PF,t
EP ∗H,t
. Note that TOTt =
PF,t
PH,t
since LOOP holds.
• By dividing (3.18) from its first lagged values, we have:
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(1 + pit) = (1 + piH,t)
γ(1 + piF,t)
1−γ (C.5)
• Recalling (2.14) and assuming that all intermediate goods forms have the same
technology, we have:
YH,t = AH,tNt (C.6)
• Recalling (2.15)
AH,t = A
ρ
H,t exp
At (C.7)
• The real marginal cost associated to the technology described in (2.14), is
defined as: RMCH,t ≡ PtWt/PH,tAH,t and the terms of trade is defined as:
TOTt ≡ PF,t/PH,t.
Since this model does not determine the optimal path for nominal variables
such as price levels, we have to rewrite the real marginal cost as follows:
By using the definitions of RMCt and TOTt described above and (3.18), we
have:
RMCH,t = φ
Wt
AH,t
TOT 1−γt (C.8)
• Since prices are flexible, by (B.14) the optimality condition for intermediate
goods firms reduces to:
RMCH,t = (1− ζ/ζ) (C.9)
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• Using the definition of TOTt and dividing it by its first lagged value, we have:
(1 + piF,t) =
TOTt
TOTt−1
(C.10)
• From (2.20) and (2.24) we have:
M˜t+1
M˜t
=
Ut+1
1 + pit+ 1
(C.11)
• Recalling (2.21), we have:
Ut = (Ut)
ς(U)1−ς exp
U
t (C.12)
• Recalling (2.22), we have:
YH,t = CH,t + C
∗
F,t (C.13)
• By using the equilibrium condition (2.24), the household’s budget constraint
(3.5), the consumer price index (3.18), the definition of terms of trade and the
fact that Πt ≡ PH,tYH,t − PtWH,tNt, we obtain the equilibrium CIA constraint:
YH,t = ˜Mt+1(1 + pit+1)φTOT
1−γ
t (C.14)
• By using the above definition of real exchange rate, the consumer price index of
each country and the LOOP, we obtain the following relationship between the
real exchange rate and the terms of trade as follows:
RERt =
φ
φ∗
TOT 2γ−1t (C.15)
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Sticky Prices
By log-linearizing the above system of equations around the steady state and by
including sticky prices, we have the following dynamic system of linear rational ex-
pectations equations:
ηnt + σct+1|t = wt (C.16)
ct = γcH,t + (1− γ)cF,t (C.17)
ct − c∗t =
1
σ
rert (C.18)
cH,t = cF,t + tott (C.19)
pi = γpiH,t + (1− γ)piF,t (C.20)
yH,t = aH,t + nt (C.21)
at = ρat−1 + At (C.22)
rmct = wt − aH,t + (1− γ)tott (C.23)
By log-linearizing (2.17)-(2.19) and (B.14) around zero inflation and by solving
the system of equations implied by this log-linearization, which is described in Gali
and Monacelli (2005) and Gali and Gertler (1999)), we obtain the NKPC:
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piH,t =
(1− χ)(1− θ)(1− βθ)
∆
rmct +
βθ
∆
piH,t+1|t +
χ
∆
piH,t−1 (C.24)
piF,t = tott − tott−1 (C.25)
mt+1 = mt + ut+1 − pit+1 (C.26)
ut = ςut−1 + Ut (C.27)
yH,t = cH,t + c
∗
F,t (C.28)
yH,t = mt+1 + piH,t+1 + (1− γ)tott (C.29)
rert = (2γ − 1)tott (C.30)
D. Currency Inovicing Rule
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let
Et−1Qt−1,tΠPCPt = Et−1Qt−1,t
[
pPCPt (h)−MCt(h)
] ∫ 1
0
C∗t (h, j
∗)dj∗ (D.1)
By plugging the analog, for the foreign country, of equations (3.14) and (3.16) in
(D.1), we have:
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Et−1Qt−1,tΠPCPt = Et−1Qt−1,t
[
pPCPt (h)−MCt(h)
] ∫ 1
0
(
pPCPt (h)
StP ∗H,t
)−θ
χ
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−α
C∗t (j)dj
∗ (D.2)
Et−1ΠPCPt (h) = Et−1Qt−1,t
{
[pPCPt (h)]
1−θSθt −MCt(h)[pPCPt (h)]−θSθt
}
Zt (D.3)
where Zt ≡ Qt−1,tχ[P ∗H,t](θ−α)[P ∗t ]α
∫ 1
0
C∗t (j)dj
∗, Qt−1,t is the firm’s exogenous discount
factor.
The profit maximization price for the firm, under PCP, is equal to:
pPCPt (h) =
θ
1− θ
Et−1
(
MCt(h)S
θ
tZt
)
Et−1
(
SθtZt
) (D.4)
By substituting (D.4) in (D.3), we have the final goods firms’ expected discounted
profit under PCP. That is,
Et−1ΠPCPt (h) = θ˜
[
Et−1
(
MCt(h)S
θ
tZt
)]1−θ [
Et−1
(
SθtZt
)]−θ
(D.5)
where θ˜ ≡ ( 1
1−θ
) (
θ
1−θ
)−θ
Let
Et−1Qt−1,tΠLCPt = Et−1Qt−1,t
[
Stp
LCP
t (h)−MCt(h)
] ∫ 1
0
C∗t (h, j
∗)dj∗ (D.6)
By plugging the analog, for the foreign country, of equations (3.14) and (3.16) in
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(D.6), we have:
Et−1Qt−1,tΠLCPt = Et−1Qt−1,t
[
Stp
LCP
t (h)−MCt(h)
] ∫ 1
0
(
pLCPt (h)
P ∗H,t
)−θ
χ
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−α
C∗t (j)dj
∗ (D.7)
Et−1ΠLCPt (h) = Et−1Qt−1,t
{
[Stp
LCP
t (h)]
1−θ −MCt(h)[pLCPt (h)]−θ
}
Zt (D.8)
where Zt ≡ Qt−1,tχ[P ∗H,t](θ−α)[P ∗t ]α
∫ 1
0
C∗t (j)dj
∗, Qt−1,t is the firm’s exogenous
discount factor.
The profit maximization price for the firm, under LCP, is equal to:
pLCPt (h) =
θ
1− θ
Et−1 (MCt(h)Zt)
Et−1 (StZt)
(D.9)
by substituting (D.4) in (D.3), we have the final goods firms’ expected discounted
profit under PCP. That is,
Et−1ΠLCPt (h) = θ˜ [Et−1 (MCt(h)StZt)]
1−θ [Et−1 (SZt )]−θ (D.10)
where θ˜ ≡ ( 1
1−θ
) (
θ
1−θ
)−θ
.
Equations (D.5) and (D.10) are the same as Devereux et al. (2004), hence the
rest of this proof is identical to the provided, in the appendix, by Devereux et al.
(2004).
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E. Model’s implicit solution
The following is the system of equations that characterize the equilibrium in this
model:
Mt = 1 + νd (At − A) + νf (A∗t − A∗) (E.1)
M∗t = 1 + ν
∗
f (A
∗
t − A∗) + ν∗d (At − A) (E.2)
P ∗t St
Pt
=
(
Ct
C∗t
)σ
(E.3)
MCt =
κPtC
σ
t N
ψ
t
At
(E.4)
MC∗t =
κP ∗t (C
∗
t )
σ (N∗t )
ψ
A∗t
(E.5)
PH,t =
θ
θ − 1
Et−1 (Qt−1,tMCtCH,t)
Et−1 (Qt−1,tCH,t)
(E.6)
PF,t =
θ
θ − 1S
η∗
t
Et−1
(
Q∗t−1,tMC
∗
t CF,t
)
Et−1
(
Q∗t−1,tCF,tS
η∗−1
t
) (E.7)
P ∗H,t =
θ
θ − 1S
−η
t
Et−1
(
Qt−1,tMCtC∗H,t
)
Et−1
(
Qt−1,tC∗H,tS
1−η
t
) (E.8)
P ∗F,t =
θ
θ − 1
Et−1
(
Q∗t−1,tMC
∗
t C
∗
F,t
)
Et−1
(
Q∗t−1,tC
∗
F,t
) (E.9)
Mt = PtCt; (E.10)
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M∗t = P
∗
t C
∗
t ; (E.11)
Pt =

1
χ˜
[
χP 1−αH,t + (1− χ)P 1−αF,t
] 1
1−α if α 6= 1
1
χ˜
P χH,tP
1−χ
F,t if α = 1
(E.12)
where χ˜ = χχ(1− χ)(1−χ)
P ∗t =

1
χ˜
[
χ
(
P ∗H,t
)1−α
+ (1− χ) (P ∗F,t)1−α] 11−α if α 6= 1
1
χ˜
(
P ∗H,t
)χ (
P ∗F,t
)1−χ
if α = 1
(E.13)
Yt = AtNt (E.14)
Y ∗t = A
∗
tN
∗
t (E.15)
Yt = CH,t + C
∗
H,t; (E.16)
Y ∗t = CF,t + C
∗
F,t; (E.17)
CH,t = χ
(
PH,t
Pt
)−α
Ct (E.18)
CF,t = (1− χ)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−α
Ct (E.19)
C∗H,t = χ
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−α
C∗t (E.20)
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C∗F,t = (1− χ)
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−α
C∗t (E.21)
(At − A) = ρ (At−1 − A) + ut (E.22)
(A∗t − A∗) = ρ
(
A∗t−1 − A∗
)
+ u∗t (E.23)
Where: vt = {ut, u∗t} is a vector, which follows a normal distribution with zero
mean and covariance matrix, Σ.
Qt−1,t = β ∗ (Pt−1
Pt
)
(
Ct−1
Ct
)σ
(E.24)
Q∗t−1,t = β ∗ (
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
)
(
C∗t−1
C∗t
)σ
(E.25)
F. Calibration
Since this model’s solution is numerical, we need to set some values for this model’s
parameters. These parameter values are reported in Table XXII, which are taken
from well known papers in international macroeconomics.
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Table XXII.
Calibration
Parameter Source
β = 0.99 Backus et al. (1992)
θ = 10 Wang and Wen (2007)
ρ = 0.9 Backus et al. (1992)
Σ1,1 = 1
a Calibrated by the author
Σ1,2 = 0.5 Backus et al. (1992)
Σ2,2 = 1 Calibrated by the author
Note: a) I assume that both countries have identical productivity shocks’ distribu-
tions.
G. Cointegration Tests
Financial Cost of Carry Model
Tables XXIII and XXIV show the Johansen cointegration tests among aluminum’s 3
months futures contracts price, aluminum’s spot price and the 90-days USA Treasury
bills. The first column denotes the number of cointegration vectors, the second column
the Johansen’s test value and the third column denotes the p-values, which are taken
from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) and computed by using Eviews 5.0. The
cointegration model used in this paper assumes the existence of constant term in
both the VAR structure and the Cointegration vector and by using the Schwartz
criterium in the VAR model, the optimal number of lags is equal to 1.
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Table XXIII.
Trace Test: Financial Cost of Carry Theory Using 3-Months Futures Contract’s Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 53.6451 0.0000
At most 1 15.5213 0.0496
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 42.5812 0.0010
At most 1 9.4778 0.3230
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 32.0677 0.0269
At most 1 5.7646 0.7231
Table XXIV.
Maximum Eigenvalue Test: Financial Cost of Carry Theory Using 3-Months Futures
Contract’s Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 38.1382 0.0001
At most 1 10.4095 0.1864
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 33.1034 0.0007
At most 1 6.8929 0.5019
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 26.3031 0.0085
At most 1 3.3212 0.9231
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Tables XXV and XXVI show the Johansen cointegration tests among aluminum’s
15 months futures contracts price, aluminum’s spot price and the 1-year USA Treasury
bonds. The first column denotes the number of cointegration vectors, the second
column the Johansen’s test value and the third column denotes the p-values, which
are taken from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) and computed by using Eviews 5.0.
The cointegration model used in this paper assumes the existence of constant term
in both the VAR structure and the Cointegration vector and by using the Schwartz
criterium in the VAR model, the optimal number of lags is equal to 1.
Table XXV.
Trace Test: Financial Cost of Carry Theory Using 15-Months Futures Contract’s
Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 30.0303 0.0470
At most 1 11.1538 0.2022
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 24.7299 0.1713
At most 1 8.3236 0.4315
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 30.5470 0.0409
At most 1 7.7182 0.4960
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Table XXVI.
Maximum Eigenvalue Test: Financial Cost of Carry Theory Using 15-Months Futures
Contract’s Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 18.8765 0.1005
At most 1 6.3807 0.5649
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 16.4064 0.2020
At most 1 5.9955 0.6138
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 22.8288 0.0286
At most 1 5.7861 0.6408
Tables XXVII and XXVIII show the Johansen cointegration tests among alu-
minum’s 15 months futures contracts price, aluminum’s spot price and the 1-year
USA Treasury bonds. The first column denotes the number of cointegration vec-
tors, the second column the Johansen’s test value and the third column denotes the
p-values, which are taken from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) and computed by
using Eviews 5.0. The cointegration model used in this paper assumes the existence
of constant term in both the VAR structure and the Cointegration vector and by
using the Schwartz criterium in the VAR model, the optimal number of lags is equal
to 1.
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Table XXVII.
Trace Test: Financial Cost of Carry Theory Using 27-Months Futures Contract’s
Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 36.0322 0.0084
At most 1 17.2978 0.0265
At most 2 5.3593 0.0206
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 22.1015 0.2929
At most 1 8.1601 0.4484
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 28.21603 0.0752
At most 1 9.0425 0.3615
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Table XXVIII.
Maximum Eigenvalue Test: Financial Cost of Carry Theory Using 27-Months Futures
Contract’s Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 18.7344 0.1048
At most 1 11.9386 0.1130
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 13.9413 0.3698
At most 1 5.5905 0.6661
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 19.1735 0.0919
At most 1 7.1842 0.4676
Cointegration Tests: Storage Cost Theory Model
Tables XXIX and XXX show the Johansen cointegration tests among aluminum’s 3
months futures contracts price, aluminum’s spot price and the 90-days USA Treasury
bills. The first column denotes the number of cointegration vectors, the second column
the Johansen’s test value and the third column denotes the p-values, which are taken
from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) and computed by using Eviews 5.0. The
cointegration model used in this paper assumes the existence of constant term in
both the VAR structure and the Cointegration vector and by using the Schwartz
criterium in the VAR model, the optimal number of lags is equal to 1.
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Table XXIX.
Trace Test: Storage Cost Theory Using 3-Months Futures Contract’s Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 113.1957 0.0000
At most 1 70.1952 0.0001
At most 2 30.5780 0.0406
At most 3 16.6187 0.0337
At most 4 6.0057 0.0143
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 102.1955 0.0000
At most 1 57.6308 0.0046
At most 2 25.3661 0.1488
At most 3 7.5544 0.5142
At most 4 1.3999 0.2367
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 75.9171 0.0150
At most 1 39.5220 0.2401
At most 2 13.9377 0.8441
At most 3 4.4076 0.8680
At most 4 0.6137 0.4334
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Table XXX.
Maximum Eigenvalue Test: Storage Cost Theory Using 3-Months Futures Contract’s
Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 43.0004 0.0031
At most 1 39.6172 0.0009
At most 2 13.9593 0.3684
At most 3 10.6130 0.1747
At most 4 6.0057 0.0143
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 44.5646 0.0019
At most 1 32.2647 0.0116
At most 2 17.8117 0.1370
At most 3 6.1545 0.5935
At most 4 1.3999 0.2367
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 36.3951 0.0245
At most 1 25.5843 0.0882
At most 2 9.5300 0.7875
At most 3 3.7940 0.8804
At most 4 0.6137 0.4334
Tables XXXI and XXXII show the Johansen cointegration tests among alu-
minum’s 3 months futures contracts price, aluminum’s spot price and the 90-days
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USA Treasury bills. The first column denotes the number of cointegration vectors,
the second column the Johansen’s test value and the third column denotes the p-
values, which are taken from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) and computed by
using Eviews 5.0. The cointegration model used in this paper assumes the existence
of constant term in both the VAR structure and the Cointegration vector and by
using the Schwartz criterium in the VAR model, the optimal number of lags is equal
to 1.
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Table XXXI.
Trace Test: Storage Cost Theory Using 15-Months Futures Contract’s Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 102.9325 0.0000
At most 1 52.4992 0.0172
At most 2 30.0574 0.0467
At most 3 13.1915 0.1080
At most 4 5.7244 0.0167
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 94.6649 0.0002
At most 1 55.5934 0.0079
At most 2 29.1114 0.0598
At most 3 7.6625 0.5022
At most 4 2.3500 0.1253
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 84.8900 0.002
At most 1 41.9359 0.1605
At most 2 20.1830 0.4105
At most 3 9.3136 0.3372
At most 4 0.5135 0.4736
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Table XXXII.
Maximum Eigenvalue Test: Storage Cost Theory Using 15-Months Futures Contract’s
Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 50.4333 0.0002
At most 1 22.4417 0.1986
At most 2 16.8659 0.1784
At most 3 7.4671 0.4355
At most 4 5.7244 0.0167
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 39.0716 0.0110
At most 1 26.4820 0.0687
At most 2 21.4489 0.0451
At most 3 5.3125 0.7020
At most 4 2.3500 0.1253
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 42.9542 0.0032
At most 1 21.7529 0.2333
At most 2 10.8693 0.6604
At most 3 8.8001 0.3032
At most 4 0.5135 0.4736
Tables XXXIII and XXXIV show the Johansen cointegration tests among alu-
minum’s 3 months futures contracts price, aluminum’s spot price and the 90-days
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USA Treasury bills. The first column denotes the number of cointegration vectors,
the second column the Johansen’s test value and the third column denotes the p-
values, which are taken from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) and computed by
using Eviews 5.0. The cointegration model used in this paper assumes the existence
of constant term in both the VAR structure and the Cointegration vector and by
using the Schwartz criterium in the VAR model, the optimal number of lags is equal
to 1.
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Table XXXIII.
Trace Test: Storage Cost Theory Using 27-Months Futures Contract’s Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 120.9274 0
At most 1 67.7809 0.0003
At most 2 40.1094 0.0023
At most 3 21.0192 0.0066
At most 4 6.3761 0.0116
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 88.8593 0.0007
At most 1 50.0714 0.0305
At most 2 26.7679 0.1074
At most 3 7.9311 0.4728
At most 4 2.7598 0.0967
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 92.6748 0.0003
At most 1 43.4766 0.1214
At most 2 24.3260 0.1870
At most 3 10.0388 0.2778
At most 4 0.4577 0.4987
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Table XXXIV.
Maximum Eigenvalue Test: Storage Cost Theory Using 27-Months Futures Contract’s
Price
Sample Number of CE Test Value P-value
1989:1 - 1999:1
None 53.1466 0.0001
At most 1 27.6714 0.0487
At most 2 19.0901 0.0942
At most 3 14.6432 0.0436
At most 4 6.3761 0.0116
1995:1 - 2005:1
None 38.7879 0.0120
At most 1 23.3035 0.1609
At most 2 18.8368 0.1017
At most 3 5.1713 0.7201
At most 4 2.7598 0.0967
2000:7 - 2010:7
None 49.1983 0.0004
At most 1 19.1505 0.4030
At most 2 14.2872 0.3419
At most 3 9.5812 0.2409
At most 4 0.4577 0.4987
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